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COMPENSATION AT THE CROSSROADS: AUTONOMOUS
VEHICLES & ALTERNATIVE VICTIM COMPENSATION
SCHEMES
TRACY HRESKO PEARL*
ABSTRACT
Fully autonomous vehicles will become available to consumers
within the next five to seven years. Experts predict that these vehicles
will be drastically safer than their human-driven counterparts and
will save thousands of lives each year in the United States alone.
However, crashes will still occur, and when they do, they will raise
unique and troubling issues about liability and fault that both
negligence and products liability jurisprudence are not yet well-
suited to handle. 
Whether the civil justice system can adjudicate autonomous vehicle
crash cases fairly and efficiently impacts (a) whether manufacturers
can afford to produce these vehicles or whether the cost and magni-
tude of litigation surrounding them will destroy their market, (b)
whether consumers will adopt this new technology, and (c) the rate
at which they will be willing and able to do so. These issues, in turn,
have an impact on how many lives can be saved on U.S. roads each
year. It is thus imperative to design a method of compensating
victims, protecting manufacturers, and giving courts time and space
to develop jurisprudence applicable to this technology if we wish to
* Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law. J.D., Boston College Law
School, 2006; M.Sc., Comparative Social Policy, Oxford University, 2003; A.B., Public Policy,
Duke University, 2002. I am grateful to my research assistant, Taylor Smith, for her excellent
work, and to Michele Thaetig for her eye for detail. Many thanks also to Professors M.
Alexander Pearl, Kyle Velte, Catherine Christopher, and Kristin Moore, and to Associate
Dean Alyson Outenreath. This Article was made possible by a generous grant from the Texas
Tech University School of Law.
1827
1828 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1827
reap the profound benefits that fully autonomous vehicles stand to
offer.
Although filing a lawsuit in the civil justice system will always be
an option for victims of autonomous vehicle crashes, a specially
designed, no-fault victim compensation fund offers a sensible way to
address the issues identified above and to resolve these cases in a
faster and less costly manner. While the use of victim compensation
funds is a fairly recent phenomenon in the United States, these funds
have been used with great success in a variety of situations and could
be used successfully here.
In the model proposed in this paper, an autonomous vehicle crash
victim compensation fund would be administered by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and financed by
a tax levied on the sale of all fully autonomous vehicles. Victims who
wish to seek compensation from the fund would be able to do so via
a simple claim form and an agreement to waive their right to sue.
Manufacturers, in turn, would be required to participate in a data-
sharing and design improvement program as a condition of receiving
protection from the fund. This program would both assist NHTSA in
gathering the information it needs to regulate autonomous vehicles
and reduce the likelihood that a victim compensation fund would
undermine manufacturer incentives to improve the safety of their
vehicles. Participation by both victims and manufacturers would be
voluntary, but the benefits of entering the fund would likely induce
high levels of participation from both.
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“America is at a historic turning point for automotive travel.
Motor vehicles and drivers’ relationships with them are likely to
change significantly in the next ten to twenty years, perhaps more
than they have changed in the last one hundred years.”
—National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 20131
INTRODUCTION
On February 14, 2016, a white Lexus SUV drove down El Camino
Real in Mountain View, California.2 After signaling that it wished
to turn right, the Lexus moved into the far right lane just before the
intersection of El Camino Real and Castro Street.3 However,
sandbags situated around a storm drain blocked the car’s path and
forced it to stop.4 The vehicles in the other lanes were stopped at a
red light, so the Lexus had to wait until the light changed and the
traffic flow resumed before attempting to inch out around the
sandbags and into the left lane.5
At first glance, this driving scenario falls far short of being
exciting, novel, or even particularly interesting. Most drivers likely
encounter similar situations on a weekly or perhaps even daily
basis, and handle them adeptly without much thought or anxiety.
Rogue garbage cans that must be avoided on residential streets,
construction equipment or barriers that block portions of highways,
and cars parallel parked too far from the curb are all part of the
American Driver’s day-to-day landscape. Yet, the sandbags and the
Lexus situation was profoundly different. It was a sea change in
that landscape. The Lexus was driving itself.6
1. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF POLICY
CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES 1 (2013), http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/
Automated_Vehicles_Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/3H32-8TYL].
2. STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, REPORT OF TRAFFIC ACCIDENT INVOLVING
AN AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE (2016), https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/wcm/connect/3946fbb8-e04e-
4d52-8f80-b33948df34b2/Google+Auto+LLC+02.14.16.pdf?MOD=AJPERES [https://perma.cc/
CD77-JDHG]. 
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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Like a human driver, the Lexus had to decide when it was safe to
move the vehicle into the left lane to travel around the sandbags.7
Its algorithms dictated that the vehicle wait for several nearby ve-
hicles to pass before making its attempt.8 Unfortunately, the car’s
algorithms misjudged the traffic flow: as the vehicle reentered the
left lane, it sideswiped a public transit bus.9 Fortunately, no
humans were injured.10 Both vehicles were traveling slowly at the
moment of impact, so the consequences were fairly nominal.11 The
Lexus sustained damage to its front fender, left front wheel, and
driver’s side sensors.12 The bus escaped with even less damage.13
Google, the designer of the autonomous Lexus, quickly claimed
“some” responsibility.14 “[I]f our car hadn’t moved there wouldn’t
have been a collision,” its monthly report stated.15 Google also seem-
ed to believe, however, that the vehicle’s mistake had not been
particularly egregious. The (human) Google employee who was mon-
itoring—but not controlling—the Lexus at the moment of the crash
noted that he had seen “the bus approaching in the left side mirror
but believed the bus would stop or slow to allow the Google [autono-
mous vehicle] to continue.”16 If the human monitor also misjudged
the situation, perhaps the autonomous vehicle’s failure was not
particularly troublesome.
Regardless of whether poor programming or merely a minor and
unavoidable blip on Google’s otherwise impressive safety record
caused this fender bender,17 this incident highlights the arrival of a
new and profoundly novel legal issue: who should be liable (if
anyone) and how should victims be compensated (if at all) when
autonomous vehicles cause injury? Although the Lexus and the bus
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See id.
14. Alex Davies, Google’s Self-Driving Car Caused Its First Crash, WIRED (Feb. 29, 2016,
2:04 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/02/googles-self-driving-car-may-caused-first-crash/
[https://perma.cc/X2KX-EVF7]. 
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. At the time of the accident, Google’s autonomous vehicles had traveled over a million
miles without causing an accident. Id.
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case did not result in litigation, we should expect such cases to arise
and to do so at any moment. Semi-autonomous (partially driverless)
cars are already available to consumers and on U.S. roads,18 and
fully autonomous ones continue to be tested on public roads in
preparation for arrival on the consumer market within the next five
years (if not significantly sooner).19 As many legal scholars have
wondered: is the American legal system ready?20
The answer to this question has implications far beyond the
resolution of individual autonomous vehicle crash cases. Whether
the American legal system can handle these cases fairly and ef-
ficiently implicates (1) the likelihood that consumers will adopt this
new technology, and (2) the rate at which they will (or will not) do
so. These implications should concern law and policy makers
immensely. If autonomous cars stand to drastically reduce the
number of fatalities and injuries on U.S. roadways—and virtually
every scholar believes that they will21—then failing to establish a
functional adjudication and compensation process risks stymieing
adoption of this technology and leaving more Americans at risk of
dying at the hands of human drivers.
The problem, of course, is that autonomous vehicles pose “a pleth-
ora of new and unique legal issues, which will need to be analyzed
to facilitate the adequate transition of this new technology to the
marketplace.”22 Chief among these are the legal implications of
automation itself. Given that, as one scholar has said, “[t]he entire
18. Andrew Connor, Semi-Autonomous Cars Bring the Self-Driving Car Closer to Reality,
GEAR PATROL (Oct. 23, 2015), http://gearpatrol.com/2015/10/23/semi-autonomous-cars-bring-
self-driving-car-closer-reality/ [https://perma.cc/2YE7-RS2T].
19. Samuel Gibbs, Google’s Self-Driving Car: How Does It Work and When Can We Drive
One?, GUARDIAN (May 29, 2014, 12:11 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/
may/28/google-self-driving-car-how-does-it-work [https://perma.cc/X5TE-KM3H]; Mike Mur-
phy, Coming in 2021: A Self-Driving Ford Car with No Steering Wheels or Pedals, QUARTZ
(Aug. 16, 2016), https://qz.com/759643/ford-self-driving-car-2012-no-steering-wheels-or-pedals-
or-handover-function/ [https://perma.cc/E95V-PNWC].
20. See, e.g., Sophia H. Duffy & Jamie Patrick Hopkins, Sit, Stay, Drive: The Future of Au-
tonomous Car Liability, 16 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 453, 454-55 (2013); Neal Katyal, Dis-
ruptive Technologies and the Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 1685, 1689 (2014); Jeremy Levy, No Need to
Reinvent the Wheel: Why Existing Liability Law Does Not Need to Be Preemptively Altered to
Cope with the Debut of the Driverless Car, 9 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 355, 365 (2016);
Kyle Colonna, Note, Autonomous Cars and Tort Liability: Why the Market Will “Drive” Au-
tonomous Cars Out of the Marketplace, 4 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 81, 117 (2012).
21. See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 20, at 1688.
22. See Levy, supra note 20, at 357.
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history of human laws has assumed that people make decisions,”23
handing those decisions over to an algorithm places lawyers and
judges into a situation in which “[w]e currently have no legal frame-
work for ... liability.”24 Worse yet, the development of automated
vehicles is already far ahead of the development of the law in this
area, and automated vehicle technology continues to advance at
rates that can often seem exponential.25 We are thus in a situation
in which we need to develop jurisprudence in and around a technol-
ogy that challenges many of American jurisprudence’s most fun-
damental assumptions. We must do so, moreover, extraordinarily
quickly or risk hampering innovation and slowing adoption of a
technology that will likely save tens of thousands of lives each year
in the United States alone.26 In short, the stakes are extremely high
and the time extremely limited.
In this Article, I explore the liability issues posed by accidents
involving autonomous vehicles and propose a way in which we can
both compensate injured victims while also creating time and space
for the civil justice system to develop a robust jurisprudence in and
around the use and development of these vehicles. It is my belief
that funneling autonomous vehicle crash cases into a specially
designed, no-fault, quasi-judicial victim compensation fund is a
sensible way to do so. Such a fund could both protect autonomous
car designers and manufacturers from high levels of uncertainty
about their exposure to liability and assure consumers that they
will be compensated fairly and quickly if an autonomous vehicle
harms them.27 Although it is not my intention to wholly replace the
tort system in cases involving autonomous technologies (and
certainly not my intention for this Article to serve as a referendum
on the value of the tort system as a whole), my hope is that my
proposed stop-gap solution will give courts “breathing room” to
adapt products liability law to the brave new world of automation
and artificial intelligence while simultaneously offering victims
23. JOHN FRANK WEAVER, ROBOTS ARE PEOPLE TOO: HOW SIRI, GOOGLE CAR, AND AR-
TIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE WILL FORCE US TO CHANGE OUR LAWS 56 (2014).
24. See Katyal, supra note 20, at 1689.
25. John Markoff, Google Cars Can Drive Themselves, in Traffic, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/science/10google.html [https://perma.cc/8YLW-LGRX].
26. Katyal, supra note 20, at 1688.
27. See infra Part II.C.
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and manufacturers greater confidence that autonomous vehicle
crash cases can be handled fairly and efficiently if and when they
occur.28
The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (NVICP)
provides an excellent example of the type of quasi-judicial compen-
sation fund that could be well-suited for autonomous vehicle crash
cases.29 Although victim compensation funds in the United States
have taken various forms—ranging from the federally funded and
publicly administered September 11th Victim Compensation Fund30
to the privately funded and privately administered Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill Trust31—the NVICP’s quasi-judicial setup, non-
adversarial process, and reliable funding mechanism make it a
better model for adjudicating autonomous vehicle crash cases.32
Additionally, as discussed at length in this Article, although the
NVICP has its shortcomings, it has a far better and more extensive
track record than many of the other types of victim compensation
funds created and administered over the last several decades in the
United States, and thus appears more likely to succeed in a context
such as this one.33
In Part I of this Article, I describe the development of autono-
mous vehicles in the United States, the way in which the federal
government has chosen to categorize them, and the benefits and
advantages they offer to consumers over human-driven vehicles. In
Part II, I explore and analyze the two courses that the United States
could take in handling autonomous vehicle crash cases: (1) sending
them through the existing civil justice system and applying exist-
ing products liability and negligence jurisprudence, or (2) creating
a victim compensation fund to handle them. In Part III, I explore
the numerous victim compensation fund design options: quasi-
judicial, public, private, and charitable. In Part IV, I propose a
28. See infra Part II.C.
29. See infra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
30. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMP. FUND,
https://www.vcf.gov/ [https://perma.cc/T2FT-X7K2].
31. See BDO CONSULTING, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE GULF COAST CLAIMS
FACILITY 3 (2012), http://media.nola.com/2010_gulf_oil_spill/other/BDO%20Executive%20
Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/BG24-LQ3P].
32. See infra notes 233-43 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
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model victim compensation fund for injuries arising from the use
of autonomous vehicles based on the NVICP, propose a mechanism
for funding, and propose a series of requirements for both manu-
facturers and victims who wish to participate in the fund.
I. BACKGROUND
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
defines autonomous vehicles as “those in which at least some as-
pects of a safety-critical control function (for example, steering,
throttle, or braking) occur without direct driver input.”34 In plain
English, this simply means that the vehicle does not require a hu-
man driver to operate it or navigate in the way that a driver must
do so in a non-autonomous vehicle.35 Instead, the vehicle uses some
combination of “cameras, radar systems, lasers (for example,
LIDAR), and Global Positioning System (GPS) units” to gather
information about the environment and make decisions about when
and how to steer, accelerate, and brake.36 Autonomous vehicles may
also eventually use vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infra-
structure (V2I) modes of communication to make such decisions,
though these technologies are still in early development.37 Both
now and in the future, however, autonomous vehicles are and will
continue to be “hybrid[s] between vehicles and computers.”38 At
base, they are nothing more than extremely complex algorithms
being applied to a mode of transportation that has existed for over
a hundred years—although this in itself is a remarkable and
society-altering feat.39
34. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 1, at 3.
35. See Kyle L. Barringer, Comment, Code Bound and Down ... A Long Way to Go and a
Short Time to Get There: Autonomous Vehicle Legislation in Illinois, 38 S. ILL. U. L.J. 121, 122
(2013).
36. Id. at 123.
37. See id.
38. Duffy & Hopkins, supra note 20, at 455.
39. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 1, at 1.
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A. Levels of Automation
In an attempt to describe the varying (and increasing) levels of
automation in vehicles, NHTSA adopted a six-level measurement of
automation in its 2016 Federal Automated Vehicles Policy (FAVP).40
Based on measurements created by SAE International, a profes-
sional association of automotive engineers, the levels of automation
are an attempt to provide “common terminology for automated
driving,” and to highlight crucial distinctions such as the distinction
between semi-autonomous and fully autonomous vehicles.41 The
levels are as follows:
Level 0: Level 0 vehicles are those without any form of automa-
tion. In these vehicles, “[t]he driver is in complete and sole
control of the primary vehicle controls (brake, steering, throttle,
and motive power) at all times, and is solely responsible for
monitoring the roadway and for safe operation of all vehicle
controls.”42 Level 0 vehicles include cars without cruise control
or more modern features like electronic stability control.
Level 1: Level 1 vehicles have “[f]unction-specific [a]utoma-
tion.”43 The driver still maintains “overall control, ... but can
choose to cede limited authority over a primary control (as in
adaptive cruise control),” or the vehicle itself may “assume
limited authority over a primary control (as in electronic sta-
bility control).”44 In either scenario, though, the driver must
maintain some level of physical control and constant vigilance
over the vehicle as a whole.45 In Level 1 vehicles, in short, “there
is no combination of vehicle control systems working in unison
that enables the driver to be disengaged from physically op-
erating the vehicle by having his or her hands off the steering
40. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY 9
(2016) [hereinafter FAVP], https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/AV%20
policy%20guidance%20PDF.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4X2-NPYX].
41. SAE INTERNATIONAL, AUTOMATED DRIVING: LEVELS OF DRIVING AUTOMATION ARE
DEFINED IN NEW SAE INTERNATIONAL STANDARD J3016 1 (2016), https://www.sae.org/binaries/
content/assets/cm/content/news/press-releases/pathway-to-autonomy/automated_driving.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EJ4T-WUHF].
42. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 1, at 4.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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wheel AND feet off the pedals at the same time.”46 A vehicle with
cruise control is an example of a Level 1 vehicle.47
Level 2: Level 2 vehicles have “[c]ombined [f]unction [a]utoma-
tion,” meaning that they have “at least two primary control func-
tions designed to work in unison to relieve the driver of control
of those functions.”48 In a Level 2 vehicle, unlike a Level 1 ve-
hicle, a driver could have his or her hands both off the wheel and
off the pedals.49 However, “[t]he driver is still responsible for
monitoring the roadway and safe operation and is expected to be
available for control at all times and on short notice.”50 The 2017
Tesla Model S with Autopilot functionality is an example of a
Level 2 vehicle.51
Level 3: Level 3 vehicles have “[l]imited [s]elf-[d]riving auto-
mation.”52 They “can both actually conduct some parts of the
driving task and monitor the driving environment in some in-
stances, but the human driver must be ready to take back con-
trol when the automated system requests.”53 As I have described
in my earlier work, “[t]he key difference between a Level 2 and
a Level 3 vehicle is the level of monitoring required by the
human driver. In Level 3 vehicles, the driver need only be
available for ‘occasional control’: when the vehicle signals to the
driver that he or she must reassume control due to, for instance,
changes in the traffic or weather patterns near the vehicle.”54
However, in Level 2 vehicles, “a human must monitor the vehicle
at all times, as the vehicle’s ability to detect what is happening
in the environment around it is much more limited.”55 Level 3
vehicles are not yet available to consumers, although experts
predict that they will be available by 2020.56
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 5.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Connor, supra note 18.
52. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 1, at 5.
53. See FAVP, supra note 40, at 9.
54. Tracy Hresko Pearl, Hands on the Wheel: A Call for Greater Regulation of Semi-
Autonomous Cars, 93 IND. L.J. 713, 718 (2018).
55. Id.
56. See Connor, supra note 18.
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Level 4: Level 4 vehicles have high automation. They “can con-
duct the driving task and monitor the driving environment, and
the human need not take back control, but the automated sys-
tem can operate only in certain environments and under certain
conditions.”57 The difference between a Level 3 and a Level 4 car
is that the driver need not be available to resume control of the
vehicle, and thus could presumably sleep, work, and/or sit away
from the driver’s seat.58 However, Level 4 vehicles may have
limitations on the situations in which they can be utilized safely.
They may, for instance, be unsafe to operate in certain types of
extreme weather, on highways with significant amounts of
construction, or on poorly marked roads.59 Level 4 vehicles are
not yet available to consumers, although they are being tested
on public roads in numerous states.60
Level 5: Level 5 vehicles have full automation in that “the
automated system can perform all driving tasks, under all
conditions that a human driver could perform them.”61 A human
driver need never be available to either supervise or control the
vehicle, and the vehicle can operate in all weather and road
conditions.62 In fact, these vehicles may have no mechanism to
allow a human driver to take control even if he or she wanted to
do so.63 Level 5 vehicles are still in development.64
As of early 2018, consumers in the United States have the option
to purchase Level 0, 1, or 2 vehicles, with Level 3 vehicles expected
to come to market soon and Level 4 vehicles likely not far behind
them.65 Although some commentators and journalists have asserted
that Level 4 and 5 vehicles are significantly further off than we
57. FAVP, supra note 40, at 9.
58. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 1, at 5.
59. See FAVP, supra note 40, at 9.
60. See Marcus E. Johnson, The Drive for Autonomous Vehicles: Idaho's Race to Catch Up,
59 ADVOCATE 28, 29 (2016).
61. FAVP, supra note 40, at 9.
62. See Pearl, supra note 54, at 719.
63. See Justin Pritchard, How Can People Safely Take Control from a Self-Driving Car?,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 30, 2015, 12:29 PM), https://www.dailyherald.com/article/20151130/
business/311309977 [https://perma.cc/6Z2J-XX66].
64. See Pearl, supra note 54, at 720.
65. Paul Ingrassia et al., How Google Is Shaping the Rules of the Driverless Road,
REUTERS (Apr. 26, 2016, 12:30 PM), http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/autos-
driverless/ [https://perma.cc/SBT9-AGXT].
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have predicted,66 if anything, “[s]elf-driving technology has devel-
oped far faster than experts envisioned when Google started
developing it in 2009.”67 This history has led numerous experts to
argue that the reverse is likely true: that Level 4 and 5 vehicles will
arrive on the market far sooner than we expect.68 Indeed, most au-
tomotive companies that are developing Level 4 and 5 vehicles are
currently predicting that their fully autonomous models will be
available by 2020.69 Even NHTSA has said that “the rapid devel-
opment of emerging automation technologies means that partially
and fully automated vehicles are nearing the point at which
widespread deployment is feasible.”70
B. Consumer Adoption
While it is unclear how many Level 2 vehicles are currently on
U.S. roads, as of 2018, the number is likely in the low hundreds of
thousands.71 Experts predict, however, that the number of people
driving automobiles with some level of automation will likely rise
sharply in the coming years.72 A 2014 IHS Automotive study, for
66. Matt Burgess, When Does a Car Become Truly Autonomous? Levels of Self-Driving
Technology Explained, WIRED (Apr. 21, 2017), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/autonomous-car-
levels-sae-ranking [https://perma.cc/UPQ4-6K56]. 
67. See Ingrassia et al., supra note 65.
68. See Brad E. Haas, Autonomous Vehicles May Impact Legal Profession, LAW. J. (Oct.
2, 2015), http://www.marshalldennehey.com/media/pdf-articles/O%20383%20by%20B.%20
Haas%20%2810.02.15%29%20Journal%20Allegheny%20County%20Bar.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9LEC-E9P9] (“While there remains a plethora of legal and social issues that must be dealt
with in this field, many experts predict that a world of driverless vehicles may be closer than
many people realize.”); Patrick Lin, The Ethics of Saving Lives with Autonomous Cars Is Far
Murkier Than You Think, WIRED (July 30, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2013/07/the-
surprising-ethics-of-robot-cars [https://perma.cc/V8S7-T6DM] (“We can see ‘robot’ or auto-
mated cars (what others have called ‘autonomous cars’, ‘driverless cars’, etc.), coming in our
rear-view mirror, and they are closer than they appear.”).
69. Trefis Team, General Motors Inching Closer to Self-Driving Cars, FORBES (Mar. 16,
2016, 8:38 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2016/03/16/general-motors-
inching-closer-to-self-driving-cars/#42c57053f35a [https://perma.cc/PYK9-DBPD].
70. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT/NHTSA POLICY STATEMENT CON-
CERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES 2016 UPDATE TO PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF POLICY CON-
CERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES 1 (2016), http://www.aamva.org/NHTSADOTAutVehPolicy
Update_Jan 2016/ [https://perma.cc/ZF6V-S27G].
71. See Pearl, supra note 54, at 719.
72. See Noah Buhayar & Peter Robison, Can the Insurance Industry Survive Driverless
Cars?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 30, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
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example, projected that there will be over 50 million self-driving
cars on U.S. roads by 2035, and that “nearly all of the vehicles in
use are likely to be self-driving cars or self-driving commercial
vehicles sometime after 2050.”73 And ten years before that study, a
different scholar posited that 75 percent of the vehicles on the road
will be fully autonomous by 2040.74 Other experts predict that, in
less than twenty years, somewhere between 25 and “75 percent of
the vehicles sold worldwide will have some degree of autonomous
capability.”75
While the United States will presumably reach a point, at some
time decades in the future, in which every vehicle on the road has
Level 5 automation, the interim years will see an interesting di-
versity of autonomous, semi-autonomous, and non-autonomous ve-
hicles driving in and around each other. The reasons for this
automobile diversity will be two-fold. First, tech companies and
automobile manufacturers are developing fully automated cars at
differing rates. Traditional automobile manufacturers are taking
what has been deemed a “gradualist” approach, increasing the level
of automation in their cars somewhat slowly over time to give con-
sumers an opportunity to adapt slowly to such changes in their
vehicles.76 Tech companies and Ford, however, are taking an “all-in”
approach to automation and do not intend to release any automated
vehicles until they have Level 4 or 5 autonomous capabilities.77
Autonomous vehicles ranging from Level 2s to Level 5s will thus
enter the consumer market at different times and at different rates
articles/2015-07-30/can-the-insurance-industry-survive-driverless-cars- [https://perma.cc/Z5
SA-LWL2]; John Villasenor, Products Liability and Driverless Cars: Issues and Guiding Prin-
ciples for Legislation, BROOKINGS (Apr. 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2016/06/Products_Liability_and_Driverless_Cars.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q848-6EVL].
73. See Villasenor, supra note 72, at 18 (quoting Press Release, IHS, Self-Driving Cars
Moving into the Industry’s Driver’s Seat (Jan. 2, 2014), http://press.ihs.com/press-release/
automotive/self-driving-cars-moving-industrys-drivers-seat) [https://perma.cc/4NVG-RQRD].
74. Andrew R. Swanson, Comment, “Somebody Grab the Wheel!”: State Autonomous
Vehicle Legislation and the Road to a National Regime, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 1085, 1094 (2014).
75. Compare Richard C. Balough, Are Your Clients Ready for the Impact of Driverless
Cars?, BUS. L. TODAY (May 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2016/05/03_
balough.html [https://perma.cc/75TF-VDXK] (projecting that 75 percent of all vehicles sold by
2035 will have some autonomous capability), with Buhayar & Robison, supra note 72
(projecting a 25 percent market share).
76. Pearl, supra note 54, at 720-21.
77. Id. at 721.
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depending on their manufacturers. It is possible, for instance, that
Toyota will just be releasing Level 2 or 3 vehicle models during the
same year that Ford releases Level 4 models.
Second, consumers will likely adopt autonomous vehicles at dif-
fering rates depending on some combination of (1) their comfort
level with autonomous vehicles (recent polling data shows that
significant numbers of Americans have fears about the safety of
driverless cars),78 (2) their commitment to staying behind the wheel
themselves (out of fear, love of driving, resistance to change, etcet-
era),79 and (3) whether they have the means to purchase a new ve-
hicle and/or one with autonomous capacities.80 Even now, in 2018,
these forces have combined to create a diversity of vehicles on U.S.
roads. Many people are still driving Level 0 cars without cruise
control capabilities while others have rushed to adopt newer ve-
hicles with Level 2 capabilities, such as Tesla’s Model S with Au-
topilot81 or Cadillac’s CT6 with Super Cruise.82 This variety of cars
on the road will likely continue and intensify over the coming ten to
fifteen years. Presumably, at some point, we will have cars of all six
levels of automation on U.S. roads.
C. Advantages of Autonomous Vehicles
Autonomous vehicles offer a panoply of advantages over human-
driven vehicles. Adoption of these vehicles in the United States
“could translate into real-life improvements by,” among other
things, “reducing the fear of car crashes, increasing productivity by
relieving congestion for busy commuters, and providing continued
78. See Tom Krisher & Justin Pritchard, Autonomous Cars Aren’t Perfect, But How Safe
Must They Be?, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.apnews.com/dea92cb3481247
a692be3a5d99f85e23 [https://perma.cc/67QU-78DJ].
79. Jamie L. LaReau, Movement Rises to Keep Humans, Not Robots, in the Driver’s Seat,
DETROIT FREE PRESS (Oct. 16, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.freep.com/story/money/cars/
general-motors/2018/10/16/fighting-keep-humans-not-robots-drivers/1601286002/ [https://
perma.cc/ZE8M-HPUP].
80. Chuck Tannert, Will You Ever Be Able to Afford a Self-Driving Car?, FAST COMPANY
(Jan. 13, 2014), https://www.fastcompany.com/3025722/will-you-ever-be-able-to-afford-a-self-
driving-car [https://perma.cc/VCV2-V838].
81. Full Self-Driving Hardware on All Cars, TESLA, https://www.tesla.com/autopilot
[https://perma.cc/52QJ-2QDJ]. 
82. Giving You the Freedom to Go Hands-Free, CADILLAC, http://www.cadillac.com/world-
of-cadillac/innovation/super-cruise [https://perma.cc/M9RD-VRCP]. 
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mobility for elderly persons who would otherwise be apprehensive
about their ability to drive safely.”83 They also offer improved
transportation accessibility to people with disabilities,84 will likely
be far more fuel efficient than human-driven cars,85 and “could
double the capacity of roads by allowing cars to drive more safely
while closer together.”86 All of these benefits have led scholars to
conclude that autonomous vehicles are “poised to be the next great
transformative transportation technology,” having “a significant
impact on how we live, work, and use our time” while also address-
ing “many enduring social needs.”87
Enhanced motor vehicle safety, however, is overwhelmingly the
largest benefit that autonomous vehicles stand to offer.88 Former
U.S. Department of Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx, for
instance, has stated that he believes consumer adoption of autono-
mous vehicles could “dramatically reduce injuries and fatalities,
perhaps by as much as 80 percent.”89 Other experts have predicted
that “if 10 percent of vehicles in use were autonomous vehicles,
1,100 fewer people would die in car accidents [per year],” and that
“[w]ith 90 [percent] penetration, the [United States] would save
21,700 lives and have 4.2 million fewer crashes per year.”90
These predictions are stunning and significant, particularly in
light of how many deaths and injuries motor vehicle accidents
cause in the United States each year. In 2015, more than 35,000
people were killed, and over 2.4 million people were injured on U.S.
roads.91 Traffic accident fatalities rose in 2016 to over 37,400,92 one
83. Frank Douma & Sarah Aue Palodichuk, Criminal Liability Issues Created by
Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1157, 1158 (2012).
84. See FAVP, supra note 40, at 12.
85. Bryant Walker Smith, Managing Autonomous Transportation Demand, 52 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1401, 1410 (2012).
86. See Markoff, supra note 25.
87. Leili Fatehi & Frank Douma, Autonomous Vehicles: The Legal and Policy Road Ahead,
16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 615, 617 (2015).
88. Jeffrey K. Gurney, Driving into the Unknown: Examining the Crossroads of Criminal
Law and Autonomous Vehicles, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 393, 402 (2015).
89. Pete Bigelow, Coolness Aside, Self-Driving Focus Should Be on Safety, CAR & DRIVER
(July 20, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.caranddriver.com/news/anthony-foxx-coolness-aside-
self-driving-focus-should-be-on-safety [https://perma.cc/ES64-3EHM].
90. Gurney, supra note 88, at 402.
91. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., NATIONAL STATISTICS (2018) [hereinafter
NHTSA STATISTICS], https://cdan.nhtsa.gov/tsftables/National%20Statistics.pdf [https://
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of the largest upticks in almost fifty years.93 The cost of these traffic
accidents to the U.S. economy is staggering: more than $240 billion
per year.94 Those numbers are almost entirely our fault. Research
studies consistently conclude that human drivers are, by far, the
leading cause of traffic accidents—accounting for nearly 94 percent
of them.95 The reasons are varied. Drunk driving accounts for over
30 percent of all motor vehicle fatalities.96 Distracted driving is also
a significant problem, accounting for 10 percent of motor vehicle
fatalities.97 One study revealed that seven in ten American drivers
said “that as a result of being distracted while driving, they have
slammed their brakes or swerved to avoid an accident, missed a
traffic signal, or actually caused an accident.”98 Beyond drunk and
distracted driving, human drivers can also cause accidents due to
“inadequate surveillance, excessive speed, incorrect assumptions,
misjudgments, illegal maneuvers, overcompensation, poor direc-
tional control, and simply falling asleep.”99
By their very nature, autonomous vehicles can eliminate nearly
all of those causes of motor vehicle accidents. They cannot drive
drunk, distracted, or drowsy.100 But they can process far more data
far more quickly than a human driver. One journalist explains:
perma.cc/VJ4F-6CW7].
92. Id.
93. Peter Kurdock, Statement from NHTSA Public Meeting on Federal Automated Vehicles
Policy, ADVOCATES FOR HIGHWAY & AUTO SAFETY (Nov. 10, 2016), http://saferoads.org/
2016/11/10/2182/ [https://perma.cc/S86W-RABU].
94. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2016 (2016), https://
crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812554 [https: //perma.cc/V68R-KBAR].
95. Carrie Schroll, Note, Splitting the Bill: Creating a National Car Insurance Fund to Pay
for Accidents in Autonomous Vehicles, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 803, 805 (2015).
96. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., 2014 CRASH DATA KEY FINDINGS (2015)
[hereinafter NHTSA CRASH DATA], https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublica
tion/812219 [https://perma.cc/KYE9-FP6K].
97. See id.
98. New Allstate Survey Shows Americans Think They Are Great Drivers—Habits Tell a
Different Story, ALLSTATE INS. CO. (Aug. 2, 2011, 1:00 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/
news-releases/new-allstate-survey-shows-americans-think-they-are-great-drivers---habits-tell-
a-different-story-126563103 [https://perma.cc/NHL9-TKZG].
99. Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving and Product Liability, 2017 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1, 12 (citation omitted).
100. Burkhard Bilger, Auto Correct: Has the Self-Driving Car at Last Arrived?, NEW YORK-
ER (Nov. 25, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/11/25/auto-correct [https://
perma.cc/NWM6-LFNZ].
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I don’t care how good of a driver you are (or you think you are):
[an autonomous] car, being for all practical purposes a robot,
can digest a huge amount of data and make a decision about the
best course of action to take in approximately the same amount
of time it takes for you to move your foot from the gas to the
brake. Our brains just don’t work fast enough to keep up, and if
something goes wrong, your car will be vastly better than you
are at keeping you (and your passengers) from harm.101
Indeed, the Level 4 autonomous vehicle that Google (now Waymo)
has been testing has a laser on its roof with 64 beams that spin
around ten times per second, “scanning 1.3 million points in con-
centric waves that began eight feet from the car.”102 These lasers can
detect a 14-inch object from roughly 160 feet away.103 Humans, by
contrast, have significantly more limited powers of vision and
perception and have significantly slower reaction times.104
Additionally, both (1) motor vehicle laws and regulations and
(2) market demand will almost certainly require that fully auton-
omous Level 4 or 5 vehicles be significantly safer than human-
driven ones before they can come to market. As one scholar predicts:
Safer performance is likely to be a social if not a legal prerequi-
site to market introduction. In informal comments, NHTSA’s
administrator has suggested that automated driving should be
at least twice as safe as conventional driving.... If these sen-
timents reflect the eventual expectations of regulators, devel-
opers, and consumers, then automated driving will not be a
101. Evan Ackerman, Study: Intelligent Cars Could Boost Highway Capacity by 273%,
IEEE SPECTRUM (Sept. 4, 2012, 2:42 PM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/artific
ial-intelligence/intelligent-cars-could-boost-highway-capacity-by-273 [https://perma.cc/DT56-
XGDC].
102. See Advait Berde, Google’s Waymo and the Science Behind Autonomous Vehicles,
MONEYCONTROL (Feb. 28, 2019, 9:08 AM), https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/technology/
auto/googles-waymo-and-the-science-behind-autonomous-vehicles-3588351.html [https://
perma.cc/5UPR-ZX4H]; Bilger, supra note 100.
103. Bilger, supra note 100.
104. See Aarian Marshall, Puny Humans Still See the World Better than Self-Driving Cars,
WIRED (Aug. 5, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/self-driving-cars-perception-
humans/ [https://perma.cc/48F2-3UJV] (arguing that human drivers are presently better than
autonomous cars, but acknowledging that autonomous driving technology has already
surpassed the human driver’s processing speeds and continues to improve in other areas).
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commercial reality unless and until it is in fact safer than
conventional driving.105
In the meantime, humans, as a group, are unlikely to get any better
at driving (and recent motor vehicle crash data suggests they may
be getting worse).106 Thus, any significant improvements in the
safety of Level 0 or 1 human-controlled vehicles will almost cer-
tainly not offset the safety gains offered by Level 4 or 5 autonomous
vehicles.
In short, highly automated vehicles stand to “drastically reduce
the carnage of road accidents and the colossal medical costs
associated with them.”107 Reducing the number of motor vehicle
crashes will, in turn, relieve “the enormous emotional toll on fam-
ilies” and lessen “related societal costs—lives lost, hospital stays,
days of work missed, and property damage—that total in the hun-
dreds of billions of dollars each year.”108 These overwhelming safety
gains, combined with autonomous vehicles’ other benefits discussed
above, should be at the forefront of public consciousness when con-
templating whether and how to introduce and integrate highly au-
tonomous vehicles onto U.S. roads. The stakes are exceptionally
high: poorly regulating and/or mishandling the transition from
human-driven vehicles to autonomous ones carries with it the risk
of reducing the number of lives these vehicles can save.
D. Risks Associated with Autonomous Vehicles
In addition to the significant benefits they offer with regard to
safety, productivity, and accessibility, autonomous vehicles also
bring with them a number of risks. Some of these risks only pertain
to certain levels of automation, whereas others are of concern at all
levels. Acknowledging all of these risks, however, is a critical step
105. See Smith, supra note 99, at 15.
106. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., 2016 FATAL MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES:
OVERVIEW 1-2 (2017), https://www.nhtsa.gov/press-releases/usdot-releases-2016-fatal-traffic-
crash-data [https://perma.cc/26RH-EG76].
107. Look, No Hands, ECONOMIST (Apr. 20, 2013), https://www.economist.com/news/special-
report/21576224-one-day-every-car-may-come-invisible-chauffeur-look-no-hands [https://
perma.cc/E47C-SDWR].
108. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 1.
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in designing laws, regulations, and compensation systems pertain-
ing to these vehicles and promoting motor vehicle safety through
innovation. Three risks, in particular, are worth noting.
First, as I have written about at length in my earlier work, Level
2 and 3 vehicles (often referred to as “semi-autonomous vehicles”)
depend on human supervision and/or human intervention in ways
that are highly troubling and likely unreliable.109 To wit:
Despite the fact that semi-autonomous vehicles rely on contin-
uous human supervision to operate safely, a growing body of re-
search demonstrates that the drivers of Level 2 vehicles are
prone to distraction. In at least one instance, this has had deadly
consequences. Furthermore, an even more troubling set of
studies suggests that both drivers and sellers of Level 2 vehicles
do not have a strong understanding of the limitations of the
semi-autonomous features of their cars and are thus at risk of
failing to intervene and retake control of the vehicle when
necessary.110
Level 3 vehicles are likely to present much the same problem when
they become available to consumers: they will rely on human drivers
to retake control in certain scenarios, but it is questionable how
safely and effectively human drivers will be able to do so given their
tendency to become distracted while driving semi-autonomous ve-
hicles.111 This issue is so significant that some autonomous vehicle
manufacturers have chosen to forego development of Level 2 and 3
vehicles entirely in favor of Level 4 and 5 vehicles that they believe
will be safer.112 Both Ford and Waymo, for instance, do not believe
“a quick handoff from machine to human is feasible” and thus
have focused their development efforts on more heavily automated
vehicles.113
109. See Pearl, supra note 54, at 731-37.
110. Id. at 755.
111. Noah J. Goodall, Machine Ethics & Automated Vehicles, in ROAD VEHICLE AUTO-
MATION 93, 97-98 (Gereon Meyer & Sven Beiker eds., 2014), http://people.virginia.edu/~njg2q/
machineethics.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TRB-CJ7H].
112. Alex Davies, Ford's Skipping the Trickiest Thing About Self-Driving Cars, WIRED
(Nov. 10, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/11/ford-self-driving-car-plan-google/
[https://perma.cc/5GW6-VKWA].
113. See Ingrassia et al., supra note 65.
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Second, although autonomous vehicles may significantly reduce
the number of accidents caused by human driver error, “faulty
technology or errors in the computer software [of these vehicles]
may cause many accidents.”114 Two scholars explain:
Serious accidents could be caused by glitches, viruses, network
failures, and programming errors that commonly afflict com-
puter-run devices. This danger is very real; car manufacturer
Toyota recently settled a class action lawsuit stemming from
personal injuries and property damages caused by the malfunc-
tion of autonomous acceleration systems in certain models that
caused the cars to rapidly and uncontrollably accelerate and
crash. While these cars were not completely autonomous, these
lawsuits serve as a harbinger of the types of computer problems
and injuries that can occur with autonomous cars.115
Another scholar states more succinctly: “surprises abound on roads
as well as in software.”116 Although automation-related glitches are
not novel, human drivers in Level 1 or 2 vehicles have at least some
chance to intervene successfully before an accident happens if
software malfunctions.117 In Level 4 or 5 vehicles, human drivers
may not have that opportunity. For instance, Google’s Level 4
prototype lacks a steering wheel and pedals.118 For highly auto-
mated vehicles, software reliability is thus much more deeply inter-
twined with the vehicle’s safety than it is for low- or no-autonomy
vehicles.
Third, scholars, journalists, and policymakers have raised con-
cerns about third parties hacking into autonomous vehicles’ com-
puter systems, assuming control, and then using the vehicles to
114. Colonna, supra note 20, at 116.
115. See Duffy & Hopkins, supra note 20, at 456 (footnotes omitted).
116. See Smith, supra note 99, at 18.
117. See State v. Baker, 571 P.2d 65, 69 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977); State v. Packin, 257 A.2d
120, 121 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1969).
118. Pritchard, supra note 63.
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achieve nefarious or deadly purposes.119 Unfortunately, there is al-
ready precedent for such activity:
In July of 2015, a hacker by the name of Samy Kamkar demon-
strated for Wired magazine how a $100 device of his own de-
vising could hack any of the automated features of the GM
OnStar system. Controlling it through an iOS or Android smart
phone app called “GM RemoteLink,” he was able to access the
car’s controls, including locating the vehicle, unlocking it, and
starting its ignition.... With [numerous] automakers developing
various levels of autonomous vehicles, and with some auto-
nomous driver assistance systems already having reached the
roadways such as BMW’s ConnectedDrive, it is an easy second
step to start taking control of the systems from similar wireless
hacks. While GM, and others, have already shored up various
flaws in their system, the inventiveness of hackers has proven
that even the best defenses are accessible over time.120
However, fears about hacking may be “overblown,” according to oth-
er scholars who point out that “car hacking is already possible for
the vast majority of cars on the roads today.”121 Additionally, both
manufacturers (which “have powerful reputational incentives at
stake here”) and engineers are actively working to eliminate secu-
rity vulnerabilities in autonomous vehicles,122 and “NHTSA has
initiated research on vehicle cybersecurity, with the goal of devel-
oping an initial baseline set of requirements.”123 Although hacking
is at least a potential risk for automated vehicles, it appears to be
a somewhat unlikely one.
Autonomous vehicles thus stand to offer significant benefits to
U.S. citizens and to introduce new and heightened forms of risk onto
U.S. roadways. On balance, however, most scholars appear to agree
119. See, e.g., Douma & Palodichuk, supra note 83, at 1164-65; Levy, supra note 20, at 385-
86; Smith, supra note 99, at 19; Self-Driving Car Guidelines: Not Enough Protection for
Consumers, CONSUMER REP. (Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.consumerreports.org/self-driving-
cars/self-driving-car-guidelines-not-enough-protection-for-consumers/ [https://perma.cc/9PZ6-
PY7P].
120. See Levy, supra note 20, at 385-86 (footnotes omitted).
121. Adam Thierer & Ryan Hagemann, Removing Roadblocks to Intelligent Vehicles and
Driverless Cars, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 339, 375 (2015).
122. Id. at 377.
123. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 1, at 7.
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that “the substantial social utility of autonomous cars” outweighs
those risks.124 If so, law and policymakers are faced with a high-
stakes quandary: how to regulate “autonomous vehicle technology
in a safe, efficient, and timely manner” to address the risks that it
poses while also promoting its development and adoption by con-
sumers.125 Moreover, they must address this technology extraor-
dinarily quickly given its development rate or risk “slower adoption
of these systems, which could lead to crash injuries that could have
been prevented.”126
II. LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION MODELS
One of the most significant questions that lawmakers and pol-
icymakers must address is the avenue and jurisprudence through
which autonomous vehicle crash victims should be compensated.127
Indeed, since current laws and regulations surrounding automobile
accident liability assume that a human driver controlled the vehicle
when the accident occurred, “existing laws do not directly address
the determination of liability in a collision involving an autonomous
car.”128 “Although existing vehicle and computer laws contain some
legal tenants that can be applied ..., they do not provide courts with
a comprehensive body of law to determine and assess liability.”129
The general public, however, is focused on who will be held liable
if and when autonomous vehicles cause injuries and wonder about
“how [the] law can bring order to an uncertain future.”130 The early
assumptions seem to be that the injured parties will be in an ad-
verse posture to the autonomous technology developers and manu-
facturers and that this conflict will play out via traditional products
liability litigation:
[I]f the human variable [is] completely removed and [a] car’s
autonomous technology cause[s] the crash, the injured person
124. See Colonna, supra note 20, at 84-85.
125. See Swanson, supra note 74, at 1096.
126. See Smith, supra note 99, at 6.
127. See Katyal, supra note 20, at 1689. 
128. See Duffy & Hopkins, supra note 20, at 455.
129. Id. (emphasis added).
130. See Smith, supra note 99, at 3.
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would sue the developer or manufacturer of the technology on a
products or strict liability theory. As a result, autonomous car
and technology manufacturers will be responsible for more
claims under products and strict liability.
As with other developing technologies, there will be technical
issues that need to be addressed. The technology will inevitably
cause accidents. Based on how courts currently analyze analo-
gous autonomous technologies, it is reasonable to anticipate
that courts will apply products and strict liability to the man-
ufacturers of autonomous cars when the car is the sole cause of
damage.131
However, given the relatively underdeveloped jurisprudence
surrounding liability for autonomous technologies and the fact that
autonomous vehicle cases have not yet begun arising with any
regularity, it would be unwise to allow these assumptions to cir-
cumscribe the options that we contemplate as we prepare for these
cases. Instead, we should give careful thought to all viable options
and choose the avenue best suited to balance both victims’ compen-
sation needs and the needs to promote innovation and adoption of
this technology.
In designing and establishing a route through which autonomous
vehicle crash victims could obtain compensation, the two most basic
options are (1) require victims to file traditional lawsuits via the
civil justice system, and/or (2) give victims the option to pursue re-
lief via an alternative compensation scheme. Stated in the most
simplified way possible, these options are, essentially, “tort system”
and “not tort system.” Though the “not tort system” option may
seem virtually limitless, the reality in the United States is that this
option has typically meant a victim compensation fund of some sort
(although, as explained at length below, those funds have varied in
type and form). Both options—the traditional tort system and a
victim compensation fund approach—have advantages and draw-
backs.
131. See Colonna, supra note 20, at 117 (footnotes omitted); see also Smith, supra note 99,
at 71. 
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A. The Tort System
The American tort system’s structure and inner workings should
be familiar to anyone with legal training. Its fundamental purposes
are to compensate innocent parties, shift the loss to responsible
parties, and deter wrongful conduct that creates an unreasonable
injury risk to others.132 In short, tort law is a way for an injured per-
son to attempt to shift the cost of harm to another person or entity
who has erred in some legally cognizable way.133 Tort liability may
be rooted in intentional conduct, negligent conduct, or strict lia-
bility.134
A plaintiff, or injured party, files a complaint that states a cause
of action with a court of jurisdiction to initiate a civil tort action.135
The complaint must request relief or damages from the defendant
and outline the legal and factual reasons why the defendant is
responsible for the plaintiff ’s injury.136 After service of process, the
defendant has a specified time in which to answer the lawsuit.137
Once the complaint and answer have been filed with the court,
attorneys for both sides may consider filing motions to dismiss.138
The parties then begin the discovery process, during which they ex-
change information and documents related to the claims made in
the complaint and defenses asserted in the answer.139
The few tort actions that are not resolved prior to trial are com-
monly tried before juries which constitute fact finders. At trial, the
plaintiff presents evidence first, and then the defendant has an op-
portunity to offer any evidence it wishes to present.140 The plaintiff
has the burden of proving his or her case by a preponderance of the
132. 1 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 1:3 (2013).
133. Eric Baime, Fundamentals of Tort Law, NAT’L JURIS .U. https://nationalparalegal.edu/
FundamentalsTortLaw.aspx [https://perma.cc/U9BL-HY75].
134. Id.
135. See FED. R. CIV. P. 3.
136. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1052 (4th ed.)
(database updated Sept. 2018), Westlaw FPP1052.
137. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A).
138. 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1190 (3d ed.)
(database updated Sept. 2018), Westlaw FPP1190.
139. See FED R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A)-(C).
140. 20 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE:
FEDERAL PRACTICE DESKBOOK § 99 (database updated Apr. 2018), Westlaw FPPDeskbook99.
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evidence, meaning that it is more likely than not that the plaintiff’s
claims are true.141 Once both sides have presented their case, the
judge or jury decides the outcome.142 If the judge enters a judgment
in favor of the defendant, the defendant is released from liability for
the plaintiff ’s claims, and the plaintiff receives no compensation.143
If the judge or jury finds for the plaintiff, the defendant is found to
be liable and the court will award damages and/or some other form
of restitution.144 If the losing party believes the outcome was legally
incorrect, they may file an appeal.145 An appellate court may dismiss
the appeal, hear and affirm the judgment, reverse it, or send it back
to the trial court with instructions to correct legal errors.146
1. Advantages of the Tort System
The tort system has two primary advantages over victim com-
pensation funds. First, unlike victim compensation funds, the civil
justice system in which tort claims are litigated is both a well-
established and highly stable institution.147 As one scholar notes,
despite the fact that technology has changed over time, the civil
justice system at the federal, state, and local levels has been
handling tort claims successfully “[f]or more than two centuries.”148
Citizens thus presumably have some understanding of—if not how
it operates precisely—its existence and the most basic aspects of its
inner workings.149 The system does not need to undergo any in-
stitutional or procedural changes to accommodate autonomous
vehicle crash cases; although, as noted below, there may be other
significant issues.150
141. 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433b (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
142. 10 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 138, § 2651, Westlaw FPP2651.
143. 11 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 138, § 2781, Westlaw FPP2781.
144. 10 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 138, § 2651, Westlaw FPP2651.
145. FED. R. APP. P. 3, 36.
146. See FED. R. APP. P. 36.
147. F. Patrick Hubbard, "Sophisticated Robots": Balancing Liability, Regulation, and In-
novation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1811-12 (2014).
148. Id. at 1811.
149. Ralph Nader, Tort Law: The Muscle of Justice, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 4, 2015, 2:51
PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ralph-nader/tort-law-the-muscle-of-ju_b_6598538.html
[https://perma.cc/C3FW-7GMN].
150. See infra Part II.A.2.
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Second, although scholars debate whether it would be inapposite
in autonomous vehicle crash cases, a robust body of products lia-
bility jurisprudence already exists in the United States and could
potentially provide an avenue of compensation for autonomous
vehicle crash victims.151 Products liability dates back to Roman
times and “is a specialized area of law that imposes liability upon
manufacturers or suppliers of goods.”152 Manufacturers can be liable
for manufacturing defects (where a product deviates from its in-
tended design), design defects (where a safer and cost-effective
design alternative exists), and warning defects (where the manufac-
turer has failed to provide information that consumers need to use
the product safely).153
In theory, products liability law should “deter manufacturers
from selling products that are not reasonably safe without deterring
these manufacturers from selling useful products that are reason-
ably safe. The regime’s actual impacts on safety and innovation,
unfortunately, are unclear and contested.”154 On the one hand, the
potential of having to pay damages as a result of a successful prod-
ucts liability claim may incentivize manufacturers and designers “to
ensure that [autonomous vehicle] systems are responsibly deployed
and continually improved.”155 On the other, products liability claims
could mean that “manufacturers of autonomous technology and cars
[may] incur more liability than they are currently accustomed,” and
thus that “some form of mitigation” may be necessary in order to
prevent the exposure to liability from driving manufacturers out of
the market entirely.156
2. Drawbacks of the Tort System
The tort system’s drawbacks in the context of autonomous vehicle
crash cases appear to be more significant than its advantages. First,
litigating a case in the civil justice system is typically an expensive,
151. See Smith, supra note 99, at 4-5; Orly Ravid, Note, Don't Sue Me, I Was Just Lawfully
Texting & Drunk When My Autonomous Car Crashed into You, 44 SW. L. REV. 175, 199 (2014).
152. Colonna, supra note 20, at 105.
153. Id. at 105-07.
154. See Smith, supra note 99, at 4-5 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
155. Id. at 5.
156. See Colonna, supra note 20, at 117.
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time-consuming, and unpredictable process.157 In recent years, the
civil justice system has experienced an increase in the number of
cases filed while simultaneously growing “at too slow a rate to keep
up with this increase.”158 This failure to increase the tort system’s
size to accommodate the influx of cases has meant that the system
has “lost its ability to adequately handle and resolve these disputes
in a timely and reasonable manner.”159 Additionally, the cost to
litigate these cases is often excessive:
[L]awsuits cost a lot of money (figures vary based on complexity
of the case); even if costs are not out-of-pocket for plaintiffs, but
recoupable after a win, plaintiffs often only recover half of the
sums paid by the defendant. It is common knowledge that plain-
tiffs sometimes recover even less, such as forty or thirty percent.
This seems a gratuitous price for injured plaintiffs to pay.160
These issues are likely to be particularly acute in autonomous ve-
hicle crash cases given the litigation’s novelty and the complex
discovery that will almost certainly need to take place.
Second, as alluded to above, while a robust body of products
liability jurisprudence and tort law may already exist,161 cases in-
volving autonomous vehicles—and nearly all other forms of auto-
mated or artificial intelligence-governed consumer goods—raise
novel liability questions that these sources of law may not be well-
equipped to handle.162 As one scholar points out, “[t]he current legal
system logically aligns with the cause of most accidents: human
error.”163 This is particularly true of motor vehicle laws, nearly all
of which presume that a human being is the driver.164 Liability
regimes will thus have to change fairly significantly to accommodate
157. See Ravid, supra note 151, at 200.
158. Michael Tsur, ADR—Appropriate Disaster Recovery, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL.
371, 372 (2008).
159. Id.
160. Ravid, supra note 151, at 200 (footnote omitted).
161. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
162. See Douma & Palodichuk, supra note 83, at 1158; Gurney, supra note 88, at 442;
Smith, supra note 99, at 2.
163. See Schroll, supra note 95, at 812.
164. See Markoff, supra note 25.
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the realities of this type of technology.165 Even the most basic issues
will need careful thought:
The major problem with autonomous vehicles is that it is
unclear who, if anyone, is actually involved with the “driving.”
If no one is driving the vehicle, who should bear ultimate
responsibility if something goes wrong? Is the “driver” of an
autonomous vehicle like the engineer of a train or pilot of an
aircraft on “autopilot,” or is she simply a passenger, with little
or no control of the vehicle’s behavior?166
Even if the legal system feels comfortable placing liability on
manufacturers or programmers rather than human users of
autonomous vehicles, the complexity of these vehicles means that
courts will still have difficult questions to answer:
[W]hat if the autonomous or semi-autonomous vehicle is a
Mercedes-Benz using a hypothetical Google geolocation product
and it crashes into a barrier while headed for an off-ramp
because it misjudged its location? Is fault attributed to Mercedes
(acting on the information), or Google (providing the informa-
tion), or the driver for not correcting for the error?167
Thus, even if products liability and other types of tort law can adapt
to this technology successfully—and there are many reasons to feel
confident that they eventually will—making these changes will
likely take decades of careful thought, deliberation, and experimen-
tation.168 In the meantime, as the technology outpaces the jurispru-
dence, years of uncertainty and problematic or nonsensical verdicts
are likely to be side effects of this process.169
Third, exposure to “product liability always looms as an obstacle
to innovation in the auto industry.”170 If autonomous vehicle
manufacturers face ongoing litigation from disgruntled consumers,
165. See Douma & Palodichuk, supra note 83, at 1158.
166. Id. at 1160.
167. Tom Vanderbilt, Navigating the Legality of Autonomous Vehicles, WIRED (Feb. 7, 2012,
6:35 AM), http://www.wired.com/2012/02/autonomous-vehicle-legality/ [https://perma.cc/S6PL-
JHV4].
168. See Levy, supra note 20, at 358-59.
169. See Markoff, supra note 25.
170. Vanderbilt, supra note 167.
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are compelled to pay to defend against these claims, and, in some
percentage of those cases, have to pay money damages, manufac-
turers could pass those costs on to consumers via higher vehicle
prices.171 This, in turn, “could lead to slower adoption of these
systems, which could lead to crash injuries that could have been
prevented by these systems.”172 Even “liability uncertainty[—]lack
of confidence about the actual product liability costs that a company
will incur”—can create significant issues.173 One scholar explains:
If an automated driving developer is unable to confidently
predict its liability costs, it may either delay deployment of its
system or conservatively price that system to account for the
possibility of high liability costs. Similarly, insurers may decline
to cover that developer or the would-be buyers of its system, or
they may demand higher premiums to do so.174
In those situations, the same consequences could occur: slower
adoption of autonomous vehicles and missed prevention of crash
injuries.175 In theory, significant exposure to liability could also stall
the market almost entirely, a situation that has happened before in
other markets as discussed below.176
Thus, while the tort system is well established, stable, and has a
highly developed body of law that could be adapted to autonomous
vehicle crash cases, it is likely to experience significant growing
pains in adapting to these cases. These changes will introduce un-
certainty and liability exposure to an industry that is still largely in
its early stages. This uncertainty may slow down innovation and
consumer adoption of this technology. In sum:
While products and strict liability will not act as an impregnable
barrier to entry, it will probably hinder the introduction of
autonomous cars into the marketplace. And while autonomous
171. See Smith, supra note 99, at 6.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN.
[hereinafter NVICP], https://www.hrsa.gov/vaccine-compensation/index.html [https://perma.
cc/5HAW-TK5U]; infra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
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cars will eliminate many tort claims against drivers due to their
increased safety and efficiency, the number of products and
strict liability claims against the manufacturers of autonomous
cars likely will increase upon introducing autonomous cars into
the marketplace.177
If this is true, the tort system may not be the best way to compen-
sate autonomous crash victims, particularly in the early years of
autonomous vehicles’ development and adoption, and thus other
compensation schemes are worth exploring.
B. Victim Compensation Funds
Victim compensation funds are fairly new innovations in the
American legal system.178 Historically, “dispute resolution was pri-
marily handled by the sovereign legal system, be it local, municipal,
regional, national, federal, or international.”179 In the twentieth cen-
tury, however, various governmental entities sought alternatives to
litigation in a variety of fairly discrete situations, hoping to prevent
an influx of certain cases into the court system, to prop up failing
industries, or to give victims a quicker and less adversarial process
to obtain compensation for their injuries.180 Victim compensation
funds were often the alternative selected.181 Although these funds
have had varying levels of success, they have been used with in-
creasing frequency—particularly in “post-disaster situations.”182
Victim compensation funds “exist in parallel to” the tort system.183
They typically offer victims a fairly quick guaranteed payout from
a fund established to compensate victims of a particular type.184 In
exchange, these victims waive their right to pursue litigation.185
177. See Colonna, supra note 20, at 114 (footnotes omitted).
178. See Tsur, supra note 158, at 372.
179. Id. at 371.
180. See Paul Heaton et al., Victim Compensation Funds and Tort Litigation Following
Incidents of Mass Violence, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 1263, 1263 (2015).
181. See id. at 1264.
182. Joan Flocks & James Davies, The Deepwater Horizon Disaster Compensation Process
as Corrective Justice: Views from the Ground Up, 84 MISS. L.J. 1, 37 (2014).
183. Heaton et al., supra note 180, at 1264.
184. Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and the Courthouse: Expe-
riences with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 645, 645-46 (2008).
185. Id.
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Given that litigation can be complex and expensive, and that lit-
igation results are typically uncertain, this option can be incredibly
appealing.186
Indeed, research reveals that a victim compensation fund’s ex-
istence “can play an important role in shaping [victim] decisions”
about whether “to pursue litigation in the wake of a tragedy.”187 In
particular, research shows that litigation is less likely in situations
in which a fund offers an alternative pathway to receiving compen-
sation, but that some portion of the victim population will still opt
to pursue conventional lawsuits.188 The number of victims willing to
opt into a fund appears to be closely tied—not surprisingly—to the
amount of compensation that the fund offers, and how closely that
amount mirrors the amount of compensation that would be avail-
able to the victim if they brought suit in the tort system and won.189
Although scholars still debate the relative merits of victim
compensation funds vis-à-vis the tort system, the popularity of these
funds in recent years suggests they are likely to remain an appeal-
ing option when responding to large scale disasters and mass tort
situations.190 These funds, however, will never entirely replace the
tort system and may not be appropriate responses to particular
types of incidents or injuries.191 A brief analysis of their major
advantages and drawbacks—with the caveat that there is signifi-
cant variation in these funds and thus these issues may be stronger
or weaker in particular funds—reveals why.
1. Advantages of Victim Compensation Funds
The primary advantages of victim compensation funds over the
tort system are threefold. First, victim compensation funds offer
significantly more flexibility than the tort system because they can
be tailored to the particular needs of a given set of cases.192 In fact,
186. Id.
187. Heaton et al., supra note 180, at 1265-66.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1279-81.
190. See id. at 1263-64.
191. See id. at 1264-65.
192. Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1361, 1375 (2005).
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several scholars have noted that “[f]lexibility and the ability to tailor
the variables to address the particular situation” are the keys to
forming a successful and appealing fund.193 Fund administrators
may decide—among other things—to what extent statutory pro-
visions that would otherwise apply in the tort system will or will not
guide the fund on how victims must request compensation, what
equations and factors will be utilized and considered in determining
compensation awards, and whether compensation decisions are
appealable (and, if so, to whom those decisions should be ap-
pealed).194 This flexibility, in turn, can reduce the cost and burden
placed on both victims and administrators in submitting and
evaluating claims.
Second, victim compensation funds are typically faster and more
efficient than the tort system. For example, the victim compensation
fund created in the wake of the 2007 Minnesota I-35W bridge
collapse disaster guaranteed that all claims would “be decided upon
and distributed within 120 days of being filed. This was undoubt-
edly years faster than the time required to take a claim to its
conclusion through the tort system.”195 The speed of the process also
guaranteed “that any award[s] would be received by the victims
quickly, alleviating the time and worry of trying to collect a judg-
ment through the tort system.”196 
Victim compensation funds can operate with such expediency for
several reasons:
By aggregating cases, [victim compensation funds] can compen-
sate huge numbers of claimants more quickly than the tort
system. Litigation tends to move more slowly. The process of
developing the case and scheduling hearings and trials in courts
with crowded dockets may result in a multi-year process (not
including appeals). An administrative system, on the other
hand, may be able to develop a compensation program in a
193. Flocks & Davies, supra note 182, at 37.
194. See George W. Conk, Diving into the Wreck: BP and Kenneth Feinberg's Gulf Coast
Gambit, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 137, 156 (2012).
195. Mike Steenson & Joseph Michael Sayler, The Legacy of the 9/11 Fund and the
Minnesota I-35W Bridge-Collapse Fund: Creating a Template for Compensating Victims of
Future Mass-Tort Catastrophes, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 524, 544 (2009) (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted).
196. Id.
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matter of weeks. While it may take a significant amount of time
for parties to develop the criteria and guidelines for an adminis-
trative program, once the program is established, the claims
facility should be able to evaluate thousands or tens of thou-
sands of claims in a matter of months.197
Although some victim compensation funds may have operated more
slowly than others, even the “slower” compensation funds appear to
have operated faster than the tort system. Many claimants, for ex-
ample, complained about “long delays” in the Deepwater Horizon
Disaster Oil Spill Trust, a victim compensation fund established in
the wake of the catastrophic 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.198
Those “delays,” however, amounted to mere months, rather than the
years it would likely take to litigate such claims in the tort sys-
tem.199
Third, victims who file claims with victim compensation funds
typically incur fewer costs than those who choose to litigate their
claims in the tort system. For instance, the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund almost entirely eliminated any costs associated
with filing a claim:
While fees for any legal matter can be extremely costly, these
costs were largely absent for claimants entering the [September
11th] Fund, thereby, making it a much more attractive alterna-
tive than the tort system. The Fund was constructed so that
claimants would have little trouble representing themselves pro
se. But, if claimants wanted assistance, it was provided pro bono
or at greatly reduced rates.200
Victim compensation funds can ensure that more money winds up
in the pockets of victims because they drastically reduce—if not
outright eliminate—attorneys fees and court costs.201
197. Deborah E. Greenspan & Matthew A. Neuburger, Settle or Sue? The Use and Structure
of Alternative Compensation Programs in the Mass Claims Context, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U.
L. REV. 97, 110 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
198. Flocks & Davies, supra note 182, at 26-27.
199. Id.
200. Steenson & Sayler, supra note 195, at 548 (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted).
201. Patrick Hall, Comment, The Return of King Solomon: The Gulf Coast Claims Facility
from the Perspective of the 9/11 Fund, 1 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 2 (2010), https://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/nr_newsletters/eltt/201104_eltt.pdf
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2. Disadvantages of Victim Compensation Funds
Victim compensation funds’ major disadvantages are also
threefold. First, unlike the tort system, which is well established,
victim compensation funds must be created anew each time they are
utilized.202 Although new funds may be modeled on prior or preexist-
ing funds, unique disasters and novel situations require the creation
of new funds without much of a blueprint.203 In these situations,
funds—and their structures, operating procedures, and policies—
must be created largely from scratch, an enormous and time-
consuming task.204 Additionally, even in situations in which there
are helpful precedents for a new fund, each new fund must be
funded, staffed, advertised to victims, and housed, all of which can
take significant time, expense, and effort.205 When smaller, but
important, administrative obligations are added to the list—
determining whether and how document retention will occur,
creating computer networks, developing and implementing confiden-
tiality policies, et cetera—creating a new fund can begin to seem
like an overwhelming burden, particularly when compared to the
fairly low administrative costs of litigating a lawsuit in the tort
system.
Second, victim compensation funds may undermine transparency.
Because these funds typically utilize a non-adversarial, nonpublic
approach to compensating victims, those victims are unable to
pursue discovery and/or air issues in a public forum. For example:
After the terrorist attacks of Sept[ember] 11, 2001, scores of
victims’ family members decided to pursue lawsuits in federal
court, bypassing a dedicated compensation fund in order to seek
not only millions of dollars in damages, but also answers and
accountability.
Many had wanted to compel a public soul-searching, and to
have the airlines and others reveal in court how their policies
and actions might have allowed 19 armed hijackers to pass
[https://perma.cc/E8U4-G8SQ].
202. See Steenson & Sayler, supra note 195, at 531.
203. Id.
204. See id. at 528-29.
205. Id.
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through airport security, board planes and carry out the
attacks.206
The victim compensation fund that had been established for 9/11
victims had no mechanism for those victims to pursue and obtain
this information in discovery, nor a way to bring this information to
public attention even if they had access to it.207 In fairness to victim
compensation funds, however, there is also no guarantee that this
will occur via litigation, either. In the September 11th lawsuits,
almost all of the victims settled and thus lost the opportunity to
promote airline accountability in a public setting.208
Third, victim compensation funds typically do not provide a public
forum in which victims can air grievances, an issue that is often
extremely important to victims.209 One scholar explains the concept
in the context of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund’s
failure to give claimants a greater opportunity to speak:
A benefit of hearings and one of the key reasons they encour-
age people to feel fairly treated is that they offer participants
what social scientists call “voice.” When people are allowed
voice—when they can speak up and are listened to—they tend
to react positively.... Voice is so important that it can powerfully
influence satisfaction in a positive direction even in situations in
which claimants are not allowed to speak until after a decision
has been made. The September 11th Fund regulations make
virtually no allowance for voice. Efficient paper processes that
avoid hearings are at the heart of the machinery. No one is
instructed to take the time to listen to the victims. No time is set
aside for stories of loss or the value of what is gone.210
206. Benjamin Weiser, Judge in 9/11 Suits Feels No Regret That None Ever Went to Trial,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/10/nyregion/judge-in-9-11-suits-
feels-no-regret-that-none-ever-went-to-trial.html [https://perma.cc/Q9AD-RC42].
207. See id.
208. Id.
209. See Tracy Hresko, Restoration and Relief: Procedural Justice and the September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 95, 131 (2006).
210. Stephan Landsman, A Chance to Be Heard: Thoughts About Schedules, Caps, and
Collateral Source Deductions in the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL
L. REV. 393, 409-10 (2003) (footnote omitted).
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Funds often overlook the importance of the opportunity to be heard
by focusing almost exclusively on providing victims with compensa-
tion. In contrast, the tort system can and often does provide victims
that opportunity via the filing of motions, the taking and giving of
depositions, and the ability to testify in open court both during trial
and—if successful—during the remedies phase of the litigation.211
C. Finding a Venue for Autonomous Vehicle Crash Cases
Given the advantages and drawbacks discussed above, which
venue (if either) is likely to be the most appropriate and efficient
one for autonomous vehicle crash cases? Assuming (as we should)
that autonomous vehicle crash victims will always have the option
to pursue conventional litigation, the question may be even simpler:
Given that these victims will always have access to the tort system,
does it make sense to create a victim compensation fund as an
alternative pathway for receiving compensation? I strongly believe
that the answer is “yes” for several reasons.
To start, as discussed at length above, there is likely to be a
lengthy multi-year—if not multi-decade—time period during which
courts struggle to develop and/or adapt negligence and products
liability jurisprudence to autonomous vehicles.212 The issues sur-
rounding duty, breach, and causation are incredibly complex and
fairly novel,213 and so it is likely that there will be some degree of
trial and error (no pun intended) and jurisprudential inconsistency
among jurisdictions before the law becomes more settled. This
means that autonomous vehicle crash victims will face even higher
degrees of uncertainty than normal when seeking compensation via
conventional litigation in the tort system. This, in turn, could deter
consumers from purchasing and using these vehicles.
Creating a victim compensation fund could provide consum-
ers—and citizens in general—with greater assurance that they will
be compensated if an autonomous vehicle injures them. Victim com-
pensation funds, by their very nature, need not experience the same
jurisprudential growing pains that the tort system may suffer when
211. See id. at 411.
212. See supra notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
213. See supra Part II.A.
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faced with a novel form of injury.214 The funds can begin issuing
compensation extremely quickly via a particular calculation method
or algorithm, and pay out to claimants much more predictably and
reliably than the tort system ever could.215 Thus, a victim compensa-
tion fund could serve as an extremely useful stop-gap compensation
method for victims until the jurisprudence in this area is better
developed. Moreover, if popular with victims, it could provide a long-
term alternative to litigation.
Next, for many of the same reasons, creating a victim compensa-
tion fund could offer significant protection to autonomous vehicle
manufacturers and developers, promote innovation, and shore up
the market for these vehicles. In the absence of such a fund, man-
ufacturers and developers experience much the same uncertainty as
do consumers, but with regard to exposure to liability.216 This
uncertain exposure to liability may severely hinder the introduction
of autonomous vehicles to the market and their long-term via-
bility.217 Indeed, the biotechnology industry in the United States
experienced something very similar in the 1980s. An article from
that time period explained:
One of the foremost obstacles faced by firms attempting to
market biotechnological products is the cost of insuring their
products against product liability claims. Product liability
insurance costs in the United States have risen dramatically to
keep up with increased legal claims....
Dramatically increased premiums for product liability
insurance [in turn] are forcing some manufacturers out of
business.... Companies are holding back product introductions,
restricting the use of certain products, or even withdrawing from
markets in order to avoid costs imposed by the U.S. product
liability system....
Insurance costs are excessive in the biotechnology industry
because judicial treatment of biotechnology products is uncer-
tain and potentially very harsh. Uncertainty arises from the fact
that the U.S. biotechnology industry has not yet been tested in
terms of product liability lawsuits, probably due to the relatively
214. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
215. Steenson & Sayler, supra note 195, at 544-45.
216. Colonna, supra note 20, at 114.
217. Id.
2019] COMPENSATION AT THE CROSSROADS 1865
small number of commercially viable biotechnology products
marketed to date.218
Uncertain exposure to liability thus creates two major potential
issues: (1) it can drive up insurance costs, forcing businesses to pass
on those costs to consumers via higher prices, making their products
less affordable and driving down demand, or (2) in extreme cases, it
may make a given product uninsurable and shut down the market
altogether.219
Establishing a victim compensation fund could create signifi-
cantly more “breathing room” for manufacturers and developers. By
offering autonomous vehicle crash victims a quick and reliable way
to obtain compensation in exchange for waiving their right to sue,
a fund could reduce the number of lawsuits filed in the tort system,
drive down manufacturers’ and developers’ liability exposure, and
lower insurance costs.220 This would allow the autonomous vehicle
market to grow in parallel with the development of autonomous
vehicle laws and jurisprudence rather than making the industry’s
development contingent upon resolving thorny liability issues—a
resolution that will likely take decades.
Lastly, since a fund provides consumers greater assurance that
they will be compensated quickly if injured and provides manufac-
turers with less exposure to liability, a victim compensation fund
could protect the autonomous vehicle market, promote highway
safety, and secure the numerous other benefits that autonomous
218. Michael D. Stovsky, Comment, Product Liability Barriers to the Commercialization
of Biotechology: Improving the Competitiveness of the U.S. Biotechnology Industry, 6 HIGH
TECH. L.J. 363, 373-74 (1991).
219. Robert G. Berger, The Impact of Tort Law Development on Insurance: The
Availability/Affordability Crisis and Its Potential Solutions, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 285, 300 (1988)
(“The viability of insurance is predicated in large part on two factors: a high degree of
predictability as to the magnitude of risk and effective independence among the individuals
or entities at risk. When one or both of these critical factors is adversely affected the viability
of insurance as an effective risk-spreading mechanism is adversely impacted: when the
insurer cannot predict the magnitude of risk, it becomes that much harder to underwrite the
risk. Accordingly, if the insurer is to ensure its own economic position, it must choose either
to increase premiums significantly to cover the expectation of an unknown and potentially
much higher degree of exposure, or withdraw from the particular market altogether.
Specifically, the ‘law of large numbers’ no longer functions properly when the magnitude and
quantity of risk among those potentially compensable cannot be accurately predicted in
advance of policies being written.” (footnotes omitted)).
220. See Heaton et al., supra note 180, at 1265-66.
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vehicles provide.221 Failing to create a victim compensation fund,
however, could have the opposite effect and undermine or—in a
worst case scenario—destroy a market still in its early stages. The
costs would be profound and measured in human lives lost that
could have been saved.222
A victim compensation fund thus offers a solution to the current
and growing gap between technology and the law. The law simply
cannot keep up with the blistering pace of this technology, a lag that
brings with it fairly significant consequences.223 One observer notes:
It took 100 years to enact laws that widely spread the benefits
of the Industrial Revolution to a prosperous middle class.... We
don’t get 100 years any more. We have 20-30 years, tops, before
the next big technological advance comes along. If we don’t
sufficiently address [artificial intelligence and technology] when
we can, its benefits might never fully enrich the middle class.224
In the case of autonomous vehicles, that last sentence might prop-
erly be amended to read, “its benefits might never fully save the
tens of thousands of lives per year that they could.” In short, the
stakes are too high and the uncertainties too great to leave autono-
mous vehicle crash cases to the tort system alone.
III. CATEGORIZING VICTIM COMPENSATION FUNDS
Victim compensation funds come in many shapes and sizes and
can vary significantly in how they are structured, funded, and
administered.225 In my observation, however, they tend to fall into
one of four broad categories: (1) quasi-judicial funds, and, within a
larger category of non-judicial funds, (2) public funds, (3) private
funds, and (4) charitable funds. Figure 1 shows this breakdown:
221. See Colonna, supra note 20, at 84.
222. See supra notes 89-103 and accompanying text (discussing automobile fatalities).
223. See Gurney, supra note 88, at 442.
224. WEAVER, supra note 23, at 184.
225. See Linda S. Mullenix, Prometheus Unbound: The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as a
Means for Resolving Mass Tort Claims-A Fund Too Far, 71 LA. L. REV. 819, 825 (2011).
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Figure 1
A brief explanation and illustration of each of these categories is
helpful to finding a workable model for an autonomous vehicle
victim compensation fund. Even though the situations giving rise to
victim compensation funds “will be a unique combination of ...
factors,” certain similarities between them “can determine the type
of justice and process that should follow.”226
A. Quasi-Judicial Funds
Judicial systems or federal agencies administer quasi-judicial
victim compensation funds outside of the traditional, adversarial
litigation context. Taxes or fines levied on particular categories of
goods, people, or entities typically finance these funds.227 State
crime victim compensation funds are one type of quasi-judicial fund,
226. Flocks & Davies, supra note 182, at 36.
227. See Njeri Mathis Rutledge, Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth — The Underutilization
of Crime Victim Compensation Funds by Domestic Violence Victims, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL'Y 223, 230 (2011); Regina Moreland, Commentary, The Potential Impact of Cedillo for
Vaccine-Related Autism Cases, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 363, 368-69 (2008).
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as they are funded by “fines, penalties, and forfeitures” issued in
criminal cases which are subject to judicial oversight.228 Similarly,
the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA) is a quasi-
judicial fund which seeks to compensate victims of above-ground
atomic testing in the mid-twentieth century and is administered by
the U.S. Department of Justice.229 The NVICP, however, is arguably
the most famous example and provides a helpful illustration of this
type of fund.
The NVICP is designed to compensate victims of injuries caused
by vaccines.230 Although vaccines are important to public health and
save lives by preventing disease, a very small percentage of vaccine
recipients will experience a severe adverse reaction that may cause
short-term or/and long-term injuries or side effects.231 When that
occurs, the NVICP may issue financial compensation to the injured
party if they file a claim with the Fund and are found to have been
injured by a NVICP-covered vaccine.232
The Court of Federal Claims administers the NVICP, and a small
excise tax on all doses of NVICP-covered vaccines finances the
Fund.233 The Fund was established after a number of vaccine man-
ufacturers neared financial ruin from lawsuits filed against them
and threatened to stop producing vaccines altogether, raising
significant concerns about a potential nationwide childhood vaccine
shortage.234 Concerned that this shortage would lead to a revival of
preventable diseases, lawmakers established the fund to compen-
sate all injuries incurred after September 30, 1988.235 Persons
eligible to make claims and receive compensation from the NVICP
include any individual vaccinated in the United States, citizens
vaccinated outside of the United States while serving abroad as a
military service member or a federal government employee, or any
228. See Rutledge, supra note 227, at 230; Crime Victims' Compensation Fund, 73 TEX. B.J.
614, 614 (2010).
229. Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-426, 104 Stat. 920 (1990)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006)); see also Peter H. Meyers, Fixing the Flaws
in the Federal Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 785, 817 (2011).
230. NVICP, supra note 176.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Moreland, supra note 227, at 368-69.
234. See NVICP, supra note 176.
235. U.S. Tax Rep. ¶ 95,104 (2018).
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dependent of a citizen who was vaccinated outside of the United
States.236
“To commence a claim under the compensation program, a
claimant must file a petition with the Court of Federal Claims.”237
The claimant must identify “the vaccine that allegedly caused the
injury, [state] where [the vaccine] was administered,” and provide
some explanation of “the nature of the ... injuries.”238 “The court
then forwards the petition to a special master, who reviews the
petition, considers evidence, and issues a ruling on the merits of the
claim.”239 The claimant qualifies for compensation when she
prove[s] that the vaccine caused the condition or that an injury
found on the Vaccine Injury Table occurred. [This] table lists
specific injuries or conditions and time frames within which the
reactions must occur after the vaccine injection. It is [thus] a
legal mechanism for defining complex medical conditions and
allows a statutory “presumption of causation.”240
The NVICP’s review process is considered both no-fault and non-
adversarial, but claimants may choose to have legal representa-
tion.241 Although vaccine injury sufferers must initially file a claim
with the NVICP rather than pursue a lawsuit in the tort system, if
the petitioner is unhappy with the outcome of their claim or does
not successfully obtain compensation from the fund, then she has
the right to file suit in civil court.242 Most scholars view this as an
effective way to balance vaccine manufacturers’ desire to avoid
crippling amounts of liability exposure with the needs of individuals
harmed by vaccines to obtain compensation in a far more predict-
able way than pursuing suit in the tort system:
236. Id.
237. Efthimios Parasidis, Recalibrating Vaccination Laws, 97 B.U. L. REV. 2153, 2211
(2017).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Karin Schumacher, Note, Informed Consent: Should It Be Extended to Vaccinations?,
22 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 89, 110 (1999).
241. NVICP, supra note 176.
242. Schumacher, supra note 240, at 110.
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[V]accine claims are few and if pursued as product liability
claims, the plaintiffs’ prospects were highly uncertain. If
lawsuits had been filed in the tort system, few would have been
paid because product liability law accepts an adequate warning
as a defense to liability. The vaccine compensation program is
best understood as a way to encourage citizens to accept the risk
of vaccine-related injury, while relieving the burdens and risks
of tort liability from manufacturers of drugs with generally
irreducible side-effects.243
In the three decades since its creation, over 12,000 claims have been
filed with the Fund, suggesting that its goals have—at least in
part—been realized.244
B. Non-Judicial Funds
Non-judicial victim compensation funds are those administered
wholly outside of the justice system by either another governmental
entity, a corporation, or a charity.245 These funds have a wide array
of financing sources and can vary significantly in both size and
scope.246 A brief analysis of each type of non-judicial fund reveals
their general characteristics.
1. Public Funds
Public victim compensation funds are those both funded—at least
in part—and administered by the government (or a special master
acting with government authority). One example of a public victim
compensation fund is the Federal Black Lung Benefits Program.
Tax revenue and employers of Black Lung sufferers finance the
Fund, and the Department of Labor and the Social Security
Administration administer it.247 A more well-known example is the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, which perhaps best
illustrates a public fund’s key characteristics.
243. Conk, supra note 194, at 149 (footnote omitted).
244. Id.
245. See infra notes 247-83 and accompanying text.
246. See infra notes 247-89 and accompanying text.
247. Allen R. Prunty & Mark E. Solomons, The Federal Black Lung Program: Its Evolution
and Current Issues, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 665, 670, 683-84 (1989).
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Created just eleven days after the attacks of September 11, 2001,
Congress established this Fund via the Air Transportation Safety
and System Stabilization Act to protect the airline industry from
what lawmakers feared would be devastating repercussions and
lawsuits.248 Congress designed the Fund to provide generous com-
pensation to families and surviving victims who voluntarily waived
their right to sue in favor of filing a claim with the Fund.249
Although the Fund provided a no-fault alternative to tort litigation
against the involved airlines, it restricted compensation awards to
any individual (or relative of a deceased person) who suffered
physical injuries or was killed as a result of the terrorist attacks.250
The Fund excluded individuals who did not suffer some discernible
physical harm or death.251
The United States Attorney General appointed a Special Master,
Kenneth Feinberg, to be responsible for all aspects of the Fund’s
administration.252 The Special Master was responsible for drafting
the Fund’s rules and regulations, creating the claimant’s application
forms, and making decisions with regard to the amounts of compen-
sation awarded.253 Because the legislation authorized “a virtual
‘blank check’” to make all necessary payments to the September
11th victims, the Special Master had unlimited funding.254 The Act
“require[d] the Special Master to complete a review of [each] ap-
plication for compensation, make a determination of the award, and
then provide written notice to the claimant of the decision” within
120 days from the date of a claimant’s application.255 Payment had
to be remitted no more than 20 days later.256 The Special Master’s
compensation decisions were not subject to judicial review and
were final.257
248. Heaton et al., supra note 180, at 1263; see William Angelley, The September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund, 65 TEX. B.J. 34, 34 (2002).
249. See Angelley, supra note 248, at 34.
250. Id.
251. See Cynthia C. Lebow, Understanding the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund:
The Proper Response or a Dangerous Precedent?, 1 ANN.2002 ATLA-CLE 243 (2002).
252. See Angelley, supra note 248, at 34.
253. Id.
254. Lebow, supra note 251, at 243.
255. Id.
256. Angelley, supra note 248, at 34.
257. Id.
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Although the line between quasi-judicial and public funds can
become blurred in some instances, the primary difference between
the two categories is that the federal government finances public
funds in whole or in part whereas excise taxes or the parties that
would be in a defensive posture in a traditional lawsuit finance
quasi-judicial funds.
2. Private Funds
Private organizations, such as corporations, administer and
finance private funds. This is the smallest category of the four vic-
tim compensation funds, and there is only one fund fitting the de-
scription as of early 2019: the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF).
This Fund was created in the aftermath of the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.258 This kind of fund also
raises the most questions and, according to at least one scholar,
“illustrates an extreme and seemingly lawless expansion of the
[victim compensation] fund approach to resolving mass claims.”259
Private victim compensation funds raise significant ethical concerns
because (1) the fund creator and administrator in this model may
also be the party at fault and (2) these funds may not be subject to
judicial or governmental oversight.260 One scholar argues:
[T]he Gulf Coast Claims Facility represents an unnoticed
incremental trend toward the lawless, private resolution of mass
claims. This resolution (in the case of the GCCF) was created by
a culpable defendant, unbounded by legal norms, and adminis-
tered by a heroic “special master” with limitless unreviewable
discretion, who also is in the employ of the malefactor. Whatever
else may be argued on behalf of the GCCF, this cannot be a good
development.261
A brief description of the GCCF’s development and administration
reveals some of the sources of this concern.
258. See Mullenix, supra note 225, at 819, 821.
259. Id. at 912.
260. Id. at 823.
261. Id.
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British Petroleum (BP), as a responsible party for the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill, established the GCCF in June 2010 to compensate
impacted parties for damages as a result of the spill.262 BP estab-
lished the Fund pursuant to an informal agreement with the Obama
administration.263 In addition to establishing the GCCF, BP agreed
to be the Fund’s sole financier via a $20 billion escrow account, and
to hire and pay someone to administer the Fund.264
GCCF’s purpose was to give impacted parties a means to resolve
their claims against BP in what was supposed to be a fair, efficient,
and timely manner.265 Persons eligible to make compensation claims
were individuals or businesses who, as a result of the spill: (1) ex-
perienced a loss of income or earning capacity, subsistence loss, and/
or net loss of profits or earnings, (2) incurred removal and cleanup
costs for their own property, and/or (3) suffered physical injury or
death.266
The GCCF began considering claims on August 23, 2010.267 The
protocol allowed claimants to “obtain emergency advance payments,
or payments designed to cover a six-month period of loss.”268 Final
claims were also allowed to be presented to the GCCF at any time.269
However, final claims required a liability release “whereby in ex-
change for payment, claimants [agreed to] forgo the rights to pursue
further oil-spill related claims or legal action against BP and other
potentially responsible parties.”270
Under the Protocol for Interim and Final Claims, the GCCF had
ninety days to decide “whether to make an interim or final payment
to a claimant.”271 Claimants had the option to reject an interim or
final payment determination and either present their claim to the
262. See Luther Strange & Kenneth Feinberg, Perspectives on the Gulf Coast Claims
Facility, TRENDS, May/June 2011, at 8.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See File a Claim, GULF COAST ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION COUNCIL, https://www.restore
thegulf.gov/file-claim [https://perma.cc/78EW-63BF].
267. See Mary Samuels, Overview of the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, ENVTL. LITIG. & TOXIC
TORTS COMM. NEWSL. 13 (Apr. 2011), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publica
tions/nr_newsletters/eltt/201104_eltt.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DJR-ZLXK].
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 14.
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National Pollution Fund Center or commence an action in court.272
“The protocol also include[d] an appeal process.”273 As a result of the
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in the Gulf Coast, “BP paid out more
than $6.2 billion to over 220,000 claims through” the GCCF.274
Although a cursory glance at the GCCF may lead one to believe
that this fund is much like the others discussed above, deeper
analysis reveals a number of significant issues:
To begin, it is difficult to discern the legal authorization for the
fund, other than vague references to the [Oil Pollution Act]. The
GCCF was not created as a mechanism to implement a contested
class action settlement, nor did Congress authorize creation of
this fund. Thus, the GCCF has not been subject to the scrutiny
that have accompanied a class action settlement or congressio-
nal oversight.
Moreover, it is difficult to characterize exactly what the GCCF
is and what legal status this entity has, if any. [The fund’s hired
administrator] has described the GCCF as a “compact,” while
federal Judge Barbier has described the GCCF as a “hybrid.”
The GCCF is a largely private claims-adjusting facility acting in
an ad hoc fashion, run by a culpable party’s retained autocrat.275
Thus, although the GCCF represents the first example of a private
fund in the United States, it is a highly controversial fund and one
that has been subject to such significant criticism that it is question-
able whether this victim compensation fund category is a viable
long-term option.
3. Charitable Funds
Charitable victim compensation funds are those financed by
private donations, typically collected in response to significant local
tragedies, set up to distribute those donations to victims equita-
bly.276 Unlike the other types of funds discussed above, charitable
funds are not created as alternatives to litigation, but simply as an
272. See id.
273. Id.
274. Heaton et al., supra note 180, at 1264 (citation omitted).
275. Mullenix, supra note 225, at 912 (footnotes omitted).
276. See Steenson & Sayler, supra note 195, at 525.
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effort to minimize the administrative and logistical burdens as-
sociated with disbursing charitable donations to those in need. The
Minnesota I-35W Bridge Collapse Fund is one example of a
charitable fund.277 The Hokie Spirit Memorial Fund (HSMF) is a
more famous one.
The HSMF was created in the wake of the April 16, 2007 Virginia
Tech shooting that claimed the lives of thirty-two victims and left
scores of faculty and students injured.278 In response to the thou-
sands of donations after the shooting, the Virginia Tech School
Foundation established the “Hokie Spirit Memorial Fund” to pro-
vide monetary compensation to victims.279 This $7.5 million fund
was entirely privately funded, and was designed to be allocated “to
the victims and their families pursuant to a proposed Victims
Assistance Program Protocol.”280 The protocol outlined the terms
and conditions of eligibility for victims and the levels of compensa-
tion.281 Both survivors of the shooting and the families of the murder
victims were qualified to receive cash payments.282 Claimants also
had the option to donate the compensation to which they were en-
titled to a charitable organization to fund scholarships at the Uni-
versity.283
Unlike the other compensation fund categories which use basic
tort law as a reference when calculating an individual’s eligibility
for compensation, the HSMF allocated “flat payments of $180,000
to each of the thirty-two families who lost a loved one on April 16.”284
The Fund made “no attempt to ... value distinctions among the
dead.”285 The payments for those who were physically injured during
the shooting were tied directly to the number of days each individ-
ual spent at the hospital.286 Hospitalization was viewed as an
unbiased measure of payment with students and faculty who were
277. See id. at 526-27.
278. See Kenneth R. Feinberg, Compensating the Victims of Catastrophe: The Virginia Tech
Victims Assistance Program, 93 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 181, 181 (2007).
279. See Heaton et al., supra note 180, at 1263-64.
280. See Feinberg, supra note 278, at 181.
281. Id.
282. See FEDERAL TAX COORDINATOR ¶ J-1297 (2d ed. 2018), Westlaw FTC ¶ J-1297.
283. See id.
284. Feinberg, supra note 278, at 184.
285. Id.
286. Id.
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hospitalized for more than three days, but fewer than ten days, to
receive a flat payment of $40,000, plus free tuition.287 “Two students
[who were] hospitalized more than ten days receive[d] $90,000 each
and free tuition.”288 “The Fund’s administrator ha[d] no discretion
to vary this payment schedule.”289
IV. A FUND FOR AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE CAR CRASH VICTIMS
If a victim compensation fund is to (1) reduce the autonomous
vehicle manufacturers’ and designers’ liability uncertainty and
liability exposure, (2) provide assurance to consumers that they will
be compensated quickly and fairly if an autonomous vehicle injures
them, and thus (3) increase the chances that society will fully reap
the benefits of autonomous vehicles, then the fund must be designed
and administered carefully and with an eye towards the unique and
complex issues that this technology poses. One must first determine
which of the victim compensation fund models explored above
provides the best template for an autonomous vehicle crash fund,
and then thoughtfully tailor the fund’s specifics to address the most
likely industry, consumer, and government regulator concerns.290
Of the four victim compensation fund models that could be used,
both the charitable fund model and the private fund model can be
quickly eliminated as options. The charitable fund’s financing is
simply inapposite and too limited in scope to be used to address the
complex issues posed by autonomous vehicles.291 Adopting a private
fund model would likely be just as problematic. Unlike the GCCF,
multiple potential defendants—all motor vehicle manufacturers who
produce autonomous vehicles—would need an autonomous vehicle
crash fund’s protection, meaning that either (1) each individual
manufacturer would have to finance and administer their own
private fund, or (2) vehicle manufacturers would have to work
together to finance and administer a joint private fund (which would
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. See Flocks & Davies, supra note 182, at 36; Smith, supra note 99, at 74; Steenson &
Sayler, supra note 195, at 597-98.
291. See supra notes 276-77 and accompanying text.
2019] COMPENSATION AT THE CROSSROADS 1877
be unprecedented in the United States).292 Both consumers and
policymakers would likely view either situation with a great deal of
skepticism—and rightly so. As the GCCF exhibited, the private fund
model presents efficiency, transparency, and conflict of interest
issues.293 The public might also have strong and reasonable concerns
about whether such a fund would disincentivize autonomous vehicle
manufacturers from improving their products and keep important
product safety and defect information hidden from public scrutiny.294
Of the two remaining models—quasi-judicial and public—a quasi-
judicial model is the far more appropriate option for one primary
reason: the federal government has little reason, political or
otherwise, to fund an autonomous vehicle crash fund. Although the
government certainly has an interest in reducing highway crash
fatalities and injuries, the United States does not face a sudden or
significant crisis in and around highway safety and/or consumer
adoption of autonomous vehicles such that the government would
likely feel compelled to finance an autonomous vehicle crash fund.295
This situation is thus fundamentally different than the one that the
federal government faced immediately prior to the formation of the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund.296 After the September
11th attacks, the airline industry risked total collapse at worst,
and a drastic rise in insurance premiums and a loss of business at
best.297 The government needed to quickly act to prevent the in-
dustry’s devastation.298 The same is not true here. Currently, auto-
mobiles are a $1.84 trillion market in the United States,299 and
autonomous vehicles are projected to be an “$87 billion opportunity
in 2030.”300 Thus the government has little reason to create a public
fund, and so a funding mechanism akin to the kind used in quasi-
judicial funds seems far more appropriate in this context.
292. See supra notes 262-75 and accompanying text.
293. See Mullenix, supra note 225, at 841-43.
294. See Hall, supra note 201.
295. See Gurney, supra note 88, at 419-20.
296. See Hresko, supra note 209, at 98-99.
297. See id.
298. Id. at 99.
299. See Levy, supra note 20, at 357.
300. Trefis Team, supra note 69.
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However, for reasons discussed at greater length below, the
federal government seems far better situated to administer an
autonomous vehicle crash fund than a court—which is unlikely to
have particularly extensive knowledge about autonomous vehi-
cles.301 One government agency in particular, the NHTSA seems
better qualified to serve this role than, say, the Court of Federal
Claims, which administers the NVICP.302 Assuming, therefore, that
a quasi-judicial fund administered by NHTSA is the most appropri-
ate autonomous vehicle crash fund model, five critical aspects of the
fund must be determined: (1) basic coverage limitations, (2) funding
source, (3) administrator, (4) participation requirements for auton-
omous vehicle manufacturers and victims, and (5) the impact of the
fund on private automobile insurance claims.303
A. Proposed Coverage Limitations
An autonomous vehicle crash fund should only be accessible to
Level 4 and 5 vehicle crash victims. The fund should not cover Level
2 and 3 crash victims because driver inattention or error is more
likely to cause these incidents than problems with the vehicle it-
self.304 Compensating victims for injuries obtained in such accidents
would mean compensating victims for a human driver’s mistake
rather than by the kind of product liability issue that the fund is
intended to cover.305 Covering semi-autonomous crashes would also
risk bankrupting the fund fairly quickly, as experts believe that
semi-autonomous vehicles are significantly less safe than their fully
autonomous counterparts, and thus far more likely to be involved in
accidents.306
Additionally, an autonomous car crash fund should only cover
human injuries and fatalities. Although car accidents also cause a
great deal of property damage, particularly to other vehicles, cov-
ering property damage would risk both bankrupting the fund and
301. See infra notes 319-25 and accompanying text.
302. Moreland, supra note 227, at 368.
303. See Flocks & Davies, supra note 182, at 36.
304. See Pearl, supra note 54, at 731-37.
305. See discussion supra Part I.A. (describing automation degrees in the various levels of
automation).
306. See Ingrassia et al., supra note 65; Pritchard, supra note 63.
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overwhelming it with far more claims than it could possibly pro-
cess.307 Moreover, property damage typically falls well within the
private automobile insurance coverage that every state requires
automobile owners to purchase, and thus there is little need for a
victim compensation fund to provide greater access to relief.308 If, at
some point in the future, the number of motor vehicle accidents on
United States roads falls by such a significant amount that the
private automobile insurance market collapses, then the fund could
reconsider its coverage of property damage. Initially, however,
limiting the fund to injury or fatality compensation claims seems
wise.
B. Proposed Source of Funding
Much like the NVICP which is funded by a small tax on every
covered vaccine administered to a patient, a sales tax on every Level
4 or 5 autonomous vehicle should finance an autonomous vehicle
crash fund. Indeed, “[s]ince autonomous cars will very likely benefit
society as a whole, as well as benefiting the users and the manufac-
turers,” requiring both manufacturers and consumers to pay into
the fund “would be a very manageable win/win, pro-market and pro-
consumer solution for all involved.”309 Under this approach, both the
new autonomous vehicle purchaser and seller would pay a tax that
would be deposited into the fund.
Calculating a reasonable tax amount—one that would ensure that
the fund was adequately financed while not overly burdening man-
ufacturers or consumers—is difficult and highly dependent on many
factors: (1) the number of autonomous vehicles likely to be sold in a
given year, (2) the likelihood of an autonomous vehicle causing an
injury or fatality, and (3) the average cost of such injuries and fa-
talities. These are all numbers, moreover, that are likely to change
over time, particularly as autonomous vehicles improve and
307. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT HS NO. 812013, THE ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL IMPACT OF MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES, 2010 (REVISED) 2 (2015), [hereinafter NHTSA
CRASH IMPACT DATA] https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812013
[https://perma.cc/683K-AQVZ].
308. See Schroll, supra note 95, at 813.
309. Ravid, supra note 151, at 205.
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increase in market share.310 An extremely speculative, rough, and
preliminary set of calculations suggests that, based on current data
and projections, a total tax of less than $1,000 per autonomous ve-
hicle sold—shared equally by the seller and the purchaser—would
be sufficient and reasonable. This estimate is based on the following
set of assumptions:
(1) In recent years, the United States has averaged roughly
35,000 fatal car crashes per year,311 with an average cost of $1.4
million per fatality, for a total annual cost of $49 billion.312
(2) In recent years, the United States has averaged roughly 2.4
million car crash-related injuries per year.313 Calculating the
average cost of injury-causing automobile crashes is exceedingly
difficult given the large variety of injuries which can occur.
However, according to one recent NHTSA report, roughly 97
percent of all injury-causing crashes cause only mild to moderate
injuries (described as Maximum Abbreviated Injury Scale Level
0-2 injuries) with an average cost of roughly $7,000 per injury,
for a total annual cost of $14.4 billion.314
(3) Experts predict that fully autonomous vehicles will reduce
the number of accidents in the United States by 94 percent
because the technology eliminates the opportunity for human
error.315
Assuming a 94 percent reduction rate in fatality-causing acci-
dents, one can predict that Level 4 and 5 autonomous vehicles will
cause roughly 1,050 fatal accidents per year. Assuming that the
average cost of $1.4 million per fatality remains the same, this
would yield a total annual cost of $1.47 billion. 
Additionally, assuming a 94 percent reduction rate in injury-
causing accidents, one could predict that Level 4 and 5 autonomous
vehicles will be involved in roughly 72,000 injury-causing accidents
per year. Assuming that the average cost of $7,000 per accident
310. See Schroll, supra note 95, at 823-24.
311. See NHTSA STATISTICS, supra note 91.
312. See NHTSA CRASH IMPACT DATA, supra note 307, at 14.
313. See NHTSA STATISTICS, supra note 91.
314. See NHTSA CRASH IMPACT DATA, supra note 307, at 12-15.
315. Schroll, supra note 95, at 805.
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remains the same, this would yield a total annual cost of $504
million.
These back-of-the-envelope calculations—and, again, I stress
their exceedingly rough nature—suggest that an autonomous ve-
hicle crash fund may have to pay out somewhere around $2 billion
per year to claimants, assuming both that (1) every injury and fa-
tality are eligible for compensation from the fund, and (2) every
injury and fatality results in a claim against the fund. Since one
recent report suggests that 7.4 million autonomous vehicles will be
sold in the United States each year by 2040, a total tax of only $270
per vehicle sold (divided between consumer and manufacturer)
would be enough to cover the fund’s annual payouts.316 At a signi-
ficantly smaller market share, say 2.5 million in 2020, a total tax of
$800 per vehicle would still be sufficient. Even if the fund’s annual
average payout is significantly higher than I have estimated, a total
tax of between $1,000 and $1,500 would still more than likely cover
those costs. These estimated tax amounts are not exorbitant,
particularly if the tax is shared between consumers and manufac-
turers.317
Thus, even under a fairly pessimistic view of the number of
autonomous vehicle crashes that will likely occur per year in the
United States, a tax equivalent to less than 2 percent of the average
total price of a new autonomous vehicle ($1,500 or less in 2018
dollars)318 should be sufficient to finance an autonomous vehicle
crash fund. As autonomous vehicle safety improves and the number
of autonomous vehicles sold per year increases, moreover, it is likely
that the tax per vehicle required to keep the fund fully financed
could drop into the very low hundreds of dollars per vehicle sold.
316. See Press Release, IHS Markit, Autonomous Vehicle Sales to Surpass 33 Million
Annually in 2040, Enabling New Autonomous Mobility in More Than 26 Percent of New Car
Sales, IHS Markit Says (Jan. 2, 2018), http://news.ihsmarkit.com/press-
release/automotive/autonomous-vehicle-sales-surpass-33-million-annually-2040-enabling-new-
auto [https://perma.cc/S4G7-LUWH].
317. Obviously, manufacturers would likely pass their portion of the tax on to consumers
by raising the price of their vehicles, but even if the total tax of $1,000 or less is borne by
consumers in some form or another, I would still argue that it is not excessive, representing
as it does less than 2 percent of the overall cost of a new vehicle, assuming average vehicle
prices stay roughly the same. See 2018 Tesla Model S, EDMONDS, https://www.edmunds.com/
tesla/model-s/2018/ [https://perma.cc/47N7-LHJN].
318. See id.
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C. Proposed Administrator
NHTSA is the federal entity best suited to administer an
autonomous vehicle crash fund because it is the federal agency
“responsible for keeping people safe on America’s roadways.”319
NHTSA does so by promulgating and “enforcing vehicle performance
standards [by forming] partnerships with state and local govern-
ments.”320 NHTSA also seeks to reduce motor vehicle crashes and
injuries by conducting research and data analysis on motor vehicle
use and misuse and motor vehicle crashes, and “by setting the motor
vehicle and highway safety agenda” for the country.321 
NHTSA is already issuing guidance with regard to autonomous
vehicles. In September 2016, NHTSA released the Federal Auto-
mated Vehicles Policy in which it “sets out an ambitious approach
to accelerate the [heavily autonomous vehicle (HAV)] revolution” by
publishing “agency guidance ... in order to speed the delivery of an
initial regulatory framework and best practices to guide manufac-
turers and other entities in the safe design, development, testing,
and deployments of HAVs.”322 It also requested cooperation and
voluntary information-sharing from autonomous vehicle manufac-
turers.323 NHTSA thus understands the characteristics and issues
surrounding autonomous vehicles and is well-positioned to “create
particular requirements for what must be sent to them as part of
filing a claim” with an autonomous vehicle crash fund.324 At least
one scholar, though one who is proposing a different type of com-
pensation scheme, agrees: “The money [for the fund] would be
stored in a trust fund and overseen by a department created within
NHTSA. Anyone who suffers damages from an AV accident would
file a claim with NHTSA, who would review the claim and dole out
payments.”325 The only other logical alternatives would be to
319. About NHTSA, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., https://www.nhtsa.gov/about-
nhtsa [https://perma.cc/84KW-J78M].
320. See id.
321. NHTSA’s Mission, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., https://www.nhtsa.gov/
about-nhtsa/nhtsas-core-values [https://perma.cc/LQ2N-DJC3].
322. FAVP, supra note 40, at 6.
323. Id. at 11, 15.
324. Schroll, supra note 95, at 824.
325. Id. at 823.
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(1) place the fund under the U.S. Department of Transportation gen-
erally, (2) designate a special master to operate outside of any par-
ticular federal agency, or (3) create an entirely sui generis federal
entity to be the administrator. None of these options, however, seem
to offer any advantages over situating the fund within NHTSA and
may instead have fairly numerous and extensive drawbacks.
D. Proposed Participation Requirements
In all victim compensation funds, “[t]he procedure to be utilized
in determining who actually receives compensation and in what
amounts is critical.”326 Similarly, fund designers must determine at
the outset what fund participants must give up in exchange for
participating in the fund.327 In an autonomous vehicle crash fund,
victims and vehicle manufacturers should have to confront different
trade-offs.
1. Victim Participation Requirements
All autonomous vehicle crash victims (or their estates) who wish
to receive compensation should be required to initiate proceedings
with the fund. Victims who intend to bypass the fund and pursue
suit in the tort system should still be required to file a claim with
the fund and receive a decision as to the compensation amount to
which they would be entitled before being able to reject the fund
option and pursue litigation. The NVICP has a similar set of re-
quirements.328 Victims (or their estates) who choose to accept the
fund’s decision and obtain fund compensation should be required to
waive their right to pursue litigation against the autonomous ve-
hicle manufacturer, designer, or programmer. Such liability waivers
have been a standard feature of most other victim compensation
funds and constitute one of the private industry’s primary incen-
tives to support and participate in such compensation schemes.329
326. Steenson & Sayler, supra note 195, at 529.
327. See id. at 529-30.
328. See Lainie Rutkow et al., Balancing Consumer and Industry Interests in Public Health:
The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and Its Influence During the Last Two
Decades, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 681, 687 (2007).
329. See Angelley, supra note 248, at 34 (discussing the September 11th Victims
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However, to the extent that these victims wish to pursue third-party
tort actions against other entities who may have been partial causes
of the relevant crash—say, human drivers, pedestrians, construction
companies, et cetera—they should remain free to do so.330
Like the NVICP, filing a claim with the autonomous vehicle crash
fund should be “nonadversarial and simple relative to [filing a claim
in the] civil courts.”331 The claimant should be required to file a
petition setting forth a short and plain statement arguing why the
claimant should be awarded compensation332 and attach any sup-
porting documentation—such as medical records—that would aid
fund administrators in determining an appropriate award.333
Claimants should have the right to legal representation, but should
not be required to retain an attorney. Like other funds, there should
also be an internal appeals process.334
In exchange for waiving their right to sue autonomous vehicle
manufacturers, designers, and programmers, victims should be en-
titled to receive compensation for “personal injury, loss of consor-
tium, wrongful death, [and other standard forms of] economic loss”
associated with their injury or death.335 Noneconomic losses, those
associated with pain and suffering, emotional and psychological
anguish, and other forms of hedonic damages are “highly intangi-
ble,” and thus far more “difficult to quantify.”336 Other funds have
established presumed awards or placed caps on emotional damages
to address this issue. For example, the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund has a presumed award of $250,000 for emo-
tional damages.337 The NVICP caps pain and suffering awards at an
identical amount: $250,000.338 Whether and at what amount an
Compensation Fund); Samuels, supra note 267, at 14 (discussing Gulf Coast Claims Facility);
Schumacher, supra note 240, at 110 (discussing the NVICP).
330. See Steenson & Sayler, supra note 195, at 530.
331. Michael J. Donovan, Comment, The Impact of “Hurricane” Hannah: The Government’s
Decision to Compensate in One Girl’s Vaccine Injury Case Could Drastically Alter the Face of
Public Health, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 229, 232 (2010).
332. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11 (2012).
333. See Schroll, supra note 95, at 824.
334. See Samuels, supra note 267, at 14.
335. Steenson & Sayler, supra note 195, at 529.
336. Hresko, supra note 209, at 102.
337. Id.
338. Rutkow et al., supra note 328, at 687.
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autonomous vehicle crash fund should compensate noneconomic
damages should be the product of careful deliberation amongst fund
administrators about the fund’s annual budget, the likely number
of noneconomic damages claims each year, and the appropriate
methodology to use in calculating such damages.
2. Vehicle Manufacturer Participation Requirements 
Reduced liability uncertainty and exposure should benefit all
vehicle manufacturers who pay sales tax on the sale of each Level
4 or 5 autonomous vehicle. As discussed above, autonomous vehicle
crash victims should be required to file claims with the fund initial-
ly rather than filing suit in the tort system immediately.339 Since the
fund is likely to be able to provide faster and more predictable com-
pensation than the tort system, it is reasonable to expect that it
would significantly reduce the number of lawsuits filed against au-
tonomous vehicle manufacturers who choose to participate.340 The
fund should (obviously) not protect manufacturers who refuse to
participate. In that situation, a victim’s only option would be to file
a conventional tort claim.
In exchange for the protection offered by the fund, manufacturers
should also be required to participate in a data-sharing and design
improvement program administered by NHTSA. Such a program
would greatly mitigate two significant issues: (1) the difficulty that
NHTSA has had in gathering information and issuing timely guid-
ance and regulations pertaining to autonomous vehicles, and (2) the
risk that reduced exposure to liability might reduce manufacturer
incentives to improve their vehicles’ design and safety performance.
A brief discussion of each demonstrates why.
First, NHTSA has had difficulty “keeping pace with the develop-
ment and deployment of autonomous systems.”341 In large part, this
has been due to both manufacturers’ and designers’ secrecy and to
the technology’s novelty.342 As one Tesla Motors representative has
339. See supra note 332 and accompanying text.
340. See Conk, supra note 194, at 156; Steenson & Sayler, supra note 195, at 549.
341. Tesla’s Autopilot: Too Much Autonomy Too Soon, CONSUMER REP. (July 14, 2016),
http://www.consumerreports.org/tesla/tesla-autopilot-too-much-autonomy-too-soon/ [https://
perma.cc/Z7SB-N4UQ].
342. Letter from Matthew L. Schwall, Dir. of Field Performance Eng’g, Tesla Motors, Inc.,
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observed, “NHTSA [has] had to ensure the safety of [heavily au-
tomated vehicles], avoid creating regulations that would slow the
deployment of life-saving technology, all without NHTSA’s usual
ability to observe the performance of technology prior to regulat-
ing it.”343 These are extremely difficult tasks at best, but likely
impossible in the absence of manufacturer cooperation and data-
sharing—a fact NHTSA itself stressed throughout the 2016
FAVP.344 Indeed, the FAVP itself is merely guidance for autonomous
vehicle manufacturers rather than rulemaking,345 and there appear
to be no consequences for failure to comply with it.346 Therefore,
manufacturer cooperation and voluntary disclosures are vital to a
successful, safe, and controlled release of fully autonomous vehicles
into the consumer market and onto U.S. roads.
Making participation in a data-sharing and design improvement
program a condition of participation in an autonomous vehicle crash
fund offers a solution to this issue. For example, NHTSA could
require fund participants to disclose all identified cyber vulnerabili-
ties, install a particular security patch in all vehicles, or address a
particular design concern within a certain timeframe. Rather than
having to either (1) rely on manufacturers to voluntarily disclose
design flaws and vulnerabilities out of a desire to act in good faith,
or (2) engage in complex and administratively burdensome rulemak-
ing, such a program would induce manufacturers to engage in a
prescribed set of socially beneficial behaviors. Although participa-
tion in this program would always remain voluntary, the protection
to Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin. (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/content
Streamer?documentId=NHTSA-2016-0090-1051&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf
[https://perma.cc/G7NT-96F3].
343. Id.
344. FAVP, supra note 40, at 15 (“To aid NHTSA in monitoring [heavily automated
vehicles], the Agency will request that manufacturers and other entities voluntarily provide
reports regarding how the Guidance has been followed.”); id. at 21-22 (“As with safety data,
industry sharing on cybersecurity is important. Each industry member should not have to
experience the same cyber vulnerabilities in order to learn from them.... To that end entities
should report any and all discovered vulnerabilities from field incidents, internal testing, or
external security research ... as soon as possible.”).
345. Id. at 6.
346. Letter from Stephen Selander, Selander Law Office, to Nathaniel Beuse, Assoc. Adm’r
for Vehicle Safety Research, Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin. (Nov. 22, 2016), https://
www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=NHTSA-2016-0090-1114&attachment
Number=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/D5YU-J82R].
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that the fund offered—through reduced liability uncertainty and
exposure—would likely provide manufacturers an extremely strong
incentive to join.
Second, many scholars argue that victim compensation funds may
reduce manufacturer incentives to take precautions, and thus fail
to provide optimal deterrence levels.347 Discussing the GCCF, for in-
stance, one scholar worries: “If the Facility sets a precedent for re-
lieving environmental marauders of full liability, it will not achieve
optimal deterrence, and thus potentially open the door for future
environmental disasters.”348 Here, the concern would be that re-
duced liability exposure would disincentivize autonomous vehicle
manufacturers from continually reviewing and improving their
vehicles’ safety features, designs, and algorithms. Again, however,
making participation in a data-sharing and design improvement
program a condition of participation in the fund would significantly
reduce, if not entirely eliminate, this issue. Through such a pro-
gram, NHTSA could identify safety issues, generate solutions, and
induce manufacturers to implement them as a condition of contin-
ued participation in the fund.
E. The Private Insurance Overlay
Considering the interplay between a victim compensation fund
and private insurance is an important part of any fund’s creation.
Two issues, in particular, deserve attention and—in the case of an
autonomous vehicle crash fund, are closely related: (1) treatment of
collateral sources, and (2) subrogation and reimbursement.349 First:
One of the problems in defining the amount of compensation to
which a victim is entitled to recover is the treatment of collateral
347. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr., The New Zealand Accident Compensation Reform,
48 U. CHI. L. REV. 781, 794 (1981) (reviewing GEOFFREY PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR
INCAPACITY (1979)) (“Generally, if actors are not required to pay a fair share of the costs of
their activities, including the accident costs, they will tend to overengage in those activities
whose costs they can most successfully escape from paying.”); Yaël Ronen, Avoid or
Compensate? Liability for Incidental Injury to Civilians Inflicted During Armed Conflict, 42
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 181, 219 (2009) (“Moreover, like any insurance mechanism, a victim
compensation fund provides a disincentive to take precautions.”).
348. Hall, supra note 201.
349. Steenson & Sayler, supra note 195, at 529-30.
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sources. What sources to deduct from the fund will be a critical
factor in determining the amount of compensation. Deductions
could be required from a variety of sources, including health and
life insurance, workers’ compensation benefits, social security
benefits, or even funds received by victims through charitable
contributions.350
Here, private automobile insurance—among other sources—may
compensate victims because it typically offers some coverage for
bodily injuries and medical expenses.351 Therefore, fund administra-
tors must determine whether benefits received from such policies
should count against any compensation to which a claimant might
be entitled to receive from the fund.
Second, “[s]ubrogation and reimbursement are key factors in
designing a compensation scheme.”352 Subrogation is a particularly
tricky issue in the autonomous vehicle crash fund context. Although
twelve states have “pure” no-fault automobile insurance regimes,353
drivers in the remaining thirty-eight states are required to pur-
chase a traditional liability automobile insurance policy.354 In those
states, if a vehicle’s manufacturing or design defect injures the pol-
icyholder, then the insurance company “become[s] subrogated to all
of the insured’s rights of recovery against the tortfeasor”; meaning
that the insurance company has the right to pursue a tort claim
against the vehicle’s manufacturer.355 These subrogation rights pose
a problem for an autonomous vehicle crash fund. If, on the one
hand, the subrogation rights of automobile insurance companies
are not extinguished upon a claimant receiving compensation from
the fund, insurance companies would still threaten autonomous
vehicle manufacturers with liability uncertainty and exposure, thus
largely undermining one of the fund’s major purposes. On the other
hand, if the subrogation rights of insurance companies are, in fact,
350. Id. at 529.
351. John McGown, Jr., Automobile Insurance Coverage, ADVOCATE, Nov. 2002, at 28.
352. Steenson & Sayler, supra note 195, at 529.
353. J. Marshall Wolman & Saba B. Hashem, Will Health Care Reform Hasten the Demise
of No-Fault Insurance?, TORT SOURCE, Spring 2012, at 6.
354. See Jeffrey O'Connell & Robert H. Joost, Giving Motorists a Choice Between Fault and
No-Fault Insurance, 72 VA. L. REV. 61, 62 (1986).
355. J.A. Bock, Annotation, Subrogation Rights of Insurer Under Medical Payments
Provision of Automobile Insurance Policy, 19 A.L.R.3d § 1054 (1968).
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extinguished upon entry into the fund, autonomous vehicles drivers’
automobile insurance premiums could increase dramatically (or
insurance companies might refuse to write these policies altogether)
as insurance companies would have no pathway to receive reim-
bursement from manufacturers.
The only sensible solution to this quandary is to compensate
claimants in full for their injuries and to give automobile insurance
companies the right to reimbursement from those awards based on
any prior payouts to the claimant. This solution protects victims,
automobile insurance companies, and autonomous vehicle manufac-
turers, and strikes a fair balance on this issue.
CONCLUSION
Fully autonomous, Level 4 and 5 vehicles will almost certainly
become available to consumers within the next five to seven years.356
Experts predict that these vehicles will be drastically safer than
their human-driven counterparts and will save thousands of lives
each year in the United States alone.357 However, crashes will still
occur, and when they do, they will raise unique and troubling issues
about liability and fault. Negligence and product liability jurispru-
dence are not yet well-equipped to address issues involving auto-
mation and artificial intelligence.358 Indeed, application of current
precedent and doctrine in these areas of the law could impair
development and adoption of these technologies.
Furthermore, this gap between automated vehicle development
and development in applicable law has created a great deal of un-
certainty for both manufacturers and consumers. Manufacturers
currently face a great deal of uncertainty with regard to liability
exposure for fully autonomous vehicles crashes. Will they be liable
for all such crashes? Only some? And what will the legal definition
of fault be in these cases? Consumers face a related uncertainty:
whether they will be compensated if they are injured or killed by an
autonomous vehicle.
356. See Trefis Team, supra note 69.
357. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
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The answers to these questions have implications far beyond the
resolution of individual autonomous vehicle crash cases. Whether
the civil justice system can adjudicate these cases fairly and ef-
ficiently impacts (1) whether manufacturers can afford to produce
these vehicles or whether the cost and magnitude of litigation sur-
rounding them will destroy their market, (2) whether consumers
will adopt this new technology, and (3) the rate at which they will
be willing and able to do so. These issues, in turn, have an effect on
how many lives will be saved on U.S. roads each year by transition-
ing away from human-driven and towards fully autonomous ve-
hicles. It is thus imperative to design an approach that compensates
victims, protects manufacturers, and gives courts time and space to
develop jurisprudence applicable to this technology if we wish to
reap the profound benefits that fully autonomous vehicles have to
offer.
Although victims will always have the option of filing a lawsuit
in the civil justice system, a specially designed, no-fault victim
compensation fund offers a sensible way to address the issues
identified above and to resolve autonomous vehicle crash cases in a
faster and less costly manner. Although the use of victim compensa-
tion funds is a fairly recent phenomenon in the United States, these
funds have been used with great success in a variety of situations
and will likely continue to be popular alternatives to the tort
system.359 In recent years, four kinds of victim compensation funds,
in particular, have been used: quasi-judicial, public, private, and
charitable.
A quasi-judicial fund is likely the best model for an autonomous
vehicle crash fund. Under this model, NHTSA would administer the
victim compensation fund, and a sales tax levied on all Level 4 and
5 vehicles would finance the fund. Preliminary calculations suggest
that a tax of less than $1,000 per vehicle sold would be enough to
finance the fund from year to year. Victims (or their estates) who
wish to seek compensation from the fund should be able to do so via
a simple claim form and non-adversarial process.360
To reduce the manufacturers’ liability uncertainty and exposure,
all autonomous vehicle crash victims who sought compensation
359. See Heaton et al., supra note 180, at 1263-64.
360. See supra Part IV.C.
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would be required to file a claim with the fund and to receive com-
pensation calculation to which they are eligible to receive. Only
after receiving this calculation would they be permitted to file a
traditional lawsuit in the tort system. Manufacturers, in turn,
would be required to participate in a data-sharing and design
improvement program as a condition of receiving the fund’s pro-
tection. This program would both assist NHTSA in gathering the
information it needs to regulate autonomous vehicles and reduce the
likelihood that a victim compensation fund would reduce manufac-
turer incentives to improve the safety of their vehicles.361
Automobile crashes kill over 35,000 people on U.S. roads each
year and injure millions of others.362 We are nearly at the point at
which we will be able to reduce those fatalities and injuries by an
overwhelming percentage. Whether we will be able to do so, howev-
er, depends upon our ability to adapt our society and our laws to
autonomous vehicles. The stakes are high and the time we have is
extremely limited. Botching our initial transition away from human-
driven cars and towards driverless ones will cost human lives. A vic-
tim compensation fund, however, offers a way to ease this transition
and make it smoother for both manufacturers and consumers alike.
Given that the existing tort system will always remain a fallback
option, there appear to be few reasons not to give a victim compen-
sation fund a chance and many reasons to design and implement
one before fully autonomous cars come to market.
361. See supra Part IV.D.2.
362. See NHTSA STATISTICS, supra note 91.
